to approve them without going to the DCI anyway. The creation of a
doubly or triply redundant superstructure of non-expert operational
management between the Director of the CS and the DCI makes sense
only if an Administration's objective is to eliminate risk even if
the cost is having a CS that has little if any chance of succeeding
in its most important missions. If this is the case, the IC and
the taxpayer would be better off without a CS.

3) Many of the best clandestine operations develop quickly
and require an oversight and approval process that, for the
government, is uniquely adaptable and timely. The DCI's
authorities have been crafted so that he can meet these
requirements. Bureaucratic layers between the DCI and the Director
of the CS are impediments to decisiveness and effective
communication, particularly to the degree that they involve the
review of administrators who are not expert in understanding the
opportunities and pitfalls of clandestine operations.

4) The CS is the focal point for the conduct of most US
intelligence liaison activities overseas (see Finding Two) and is
the arm of the government principally tasked to carry out covert
actions -- that is those covert activities undertaken at the
President's request in furtherance of US foreign policy. In
effect, the CS, under the direction of the DCI, acts as a de facto
clandestine or covert arm of US foreign policy. This is hardly an
overstatement in several important countries where the political
leaderships have chosen, for a variety of reasons, to carry out
their more sensitive political discussions with the US President
through intelligence rather than Department of State channels.
Covert action and foreign political functions are activities very
different from intelligence collection, and it makes little sense
to have the IC management superstructure in the chain of command
for the DCI's management of these policy related activities.
Simply put, the DCI must be fully cognizant and directly in control
of these activities through the individual responsible for their
being carried out -- the Director of the CS.

5) As documented elsewhere in this report, the CS, despite
its relatively small size in the IC, provides a disproportionate
amount of intelligence of critical value to meeting national level
intelligence requirements (that is those of greatest interest to
the President and the NSC). When it performs well, the CS is
particularly important as a source of highly sensitive information
on the plans and intentions of foreign powers. In some ways the
CS's importance to the policymaker is analogous to the importance
of SIGINT and, most particularly, IMINT, in supporting the tactical
military intelligence consumer. The placement of the CS in the IC
should maximize the DCI's ability to exploit and task the
clandestine system directly./14/