

to approve them without going to the DCI anyway. The creation of a doubly or triply redundant superstructure of non-expert operational management between the Director of the CS and the DCI makes sense only if an Administration's objective is to eliminate risk even if the cost is having a CS that has little if any chance of succeeding in its most important missions. If this is the case, the IC and the taxpayer would be better off without a CS.

3) Many of the best clandestine operations develop quickly and require an oversight and approval process that, for the government, is uniquely adaptable and timely. The DCI's authorities have been crafted so that he can meet these requirements. Bureaucratic layers between the DCI and the Director of the CS are impediments to decisiveness and effective communication, particularly to the degree that they involve the review of administrators who are not expert in understanding the opportunities and pitfalls of clandestine operations.

4) The CS is the focal point for the conduct of most US intelligence liaison activities overseas (see Finding Two) and is the arm of the government principally tasked to carry out covert actions -- that is those covert activities undertaken at the President's request in furtherance of US foreign policy. In effect, the CS, under the direction of the DCI, acts as a de facto clandestine or covert arm of US foreign policy. This is hardly an overstatement in several important countries where the political leaderships have chosen, for a variety of reasons, to carry out their more sensitive political discussions with the US President through intelligence rather than Department of State channels. Covert action and foreign political functions are activities very different from intelligence collection, and it makes little sense to have the IC management superstructure in the chain of command for the DCI's management of these policy related activities. Simply put, the DCI must be fully cognizant and directly in control of these activities through the individual responsible for their being carried out -- the Director of the CS.

5) As documented elsewhere in this report, the CS, despite its relatively small size in the IC, provides a disproportionate amount of intelligence of critical value to meeting national level intelligence requirements (that is those of greatest interest to the President and the NSC). When it performs well, the CS is particularly important as a source of highly sensitive information on the plans and intentions of foreign powers. In some ways the CS's importance to the policymaker is analogous to the importance of SIGINT and, most particularly, IMINT, in supporting the tactical military intelligence consumer. The placement of the CS in the IC should maximize the DCI's ability to exploit and task the clandestine system directly./14/