Additionally, he has stated that his DDCI is also responsible for overseeing the DO. As described to one journalist, the DDCI "has taken the overall supervisory role in directorate affairs, while day-to-day responsibility for decisions on personnel, operations and other issues goes to [the Executive Director]."/13/ It is not clear, under this system, what the responsibilities are of the current DDO. Interestingly, none of the three -- the DDCI, the Executive Director, and the DDO -- have experience in clandestine operations.

Although the IC21 studies recognize and, indeed, encourage the expansion of the DCI's Community role, it makes little sense to do that by attenuating the DCI's supervision and knowledge of the activities of a CS. Moreover, as would be the case in the military, it makes even less sense to create duplicative or even a triply redundant operational management of a CS -- particularly to the degree this process inserts inexpert judgment.

The following are a few of the arguments for the most direct and proximate DCI control possible.

1) Most of the operations of the CS are, by all accounts, the most tricky, politically sensitive, and troublesome of those in the IC and frequently require the DCI's close personal attention. The CS is the only part of the IC, indeed of the government, where hundreds of employees on a daily basis are directed to break extremely serious laws in counties around the world in the face of frequently sophisticated efforts by foreign governments to catch them. A safe estimate is that several hundred times every day (easily 100,000 times a year) DO officers engage in highly illegal activities (according to foreign law) that not only risk political embarrassment to the US but also endanger the freedom if not lives of the participating foreign nationals and, more than occasionally, of the clandestine officer himself. In other words, a typical 28 year old, GS-11 case officer has numerous opportunities every week, by poor tradecraft or inattention, to embarrass his country and President and to get agents imprisoned or executed. Considering these facts and recent history, which has shown that the DCI, whether he wants to or not, is held accountable for overseeing the CS, the DCI must work closely with the Director of the CS and hold him fully and directly responsible to him.

2) For the President and the DCI to feel confident that the benefits of having a functioning CS outweigh the risks, they must feel confident that the reporting chain is direct and personally accountable to them. Without this confidence, the CS will not be trusted and it will inevitably come under an inexpert, risk-averse bureaucratic review process, with each layer comfortable with rejecting and questioning operational opportunities but reluctant