practitioners of clandestine operations and intelligence managers, we believe the CS of the future must strive for a global presence. At the least, it ought not to reduce the number of its overseas stations and bases below current levels. Two arguments are particularly strong.

First, a global presence is essential to support military requirements. Although this study strongly concludes that the CS should concentrate on the hard targets and the highest level national requirements that it uniquely satisfies, it also believes the CS of the future must accept fully the responsibility to support military operations to the degree it reasonably can. As is argued in Finding Four, the CS must accept its responsibility to support the requirements of the military not only for strategic intelligence -- something in which it can excel -- but also for appropriate tactical intelligence support in times and places of military engagement -- a responsibility that often falls to it only by default. Recent history has shown that it is increasingly difficult to know in advance where the military might be deployed and where the CS should begin building up capabilities in advance.

A second argument for a global presence is that the targets of the CS are increasingly international and transnational and a global presence is increasingly crucial to attack those targets. Terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, narcotics, and international organized crime are all recognized in a variety of NSC and Presidential directives as high priority requirements of the intelligence community. These are also issues on which the National Strategic Intelligence Reviews and the Comprehensive Capabilities Review have shown the policymaker is heavily reliant on HUMINT. The National HUMINT Requirements Tasking Center has, it appears correctly, given detailed and high-priority taskings to clandestine operators around the world to go against these targets. With the mobility of populations, fungibility of finances, internationalization of businesses, and advances in communications and transportation, the whole world is increasingly the playground of the targets of such operations. A weapons proliferator can set up a front company in a sleepy Central Africa capital and a terrorist cell can relocate to an obscure provincial city in South America in a matter of days or weeks. It is only by having a presence in those countries that a CS can have a stable of agents to help mount unilateral operations or be able to seek the help of a friendly liaison service. Under these circumstances, the CS cannot simply write off large parts of the globe.

Finding #6: The Clandestine Service should be under the direct control of the DCI and form a separate organization.