Information on Status of Nuclear Power Plants in Fukushima



Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.

Policy on information and compilation

This JAIF-compiled information chart represents the situation, phenomena, and operations in which JAIF estimates and guesses the reactors and related facilities are, based on the latest data and information directly and indirectly made available by the relevant organizations when JAIF's updating works done. Consequently, JAIF may make necessary changes to descriptions in the chart, once (1) new developments have occurred in the status of reactors and facilities and (2) JAIF has judged so needed after reexamining the prior information and judgments. JAIF will do its best to keep tracks on the information on the nuclear power plants quickly and accurately.

Status of nuclear power plants in Fukushima <u>as of 12:00, May 22nd</u> (Estimated by JAIF)

Power Station		· ·	Fukushima Dai−ichi Nuclear Power Stat	lon		
Unit	1	2	3	4	5	6
Electric / Thermal Power output (MW)	460 / 1380	784 / 2381	784 / 2381	784 / 2381	784 / 2381	1100 /3293
Type of Reactor	BWR-3	BWR-4	BWR-4	BWR-4	BWR-4	BWR-5
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service -> Shutdown	In Service -> Shutdown	In Service -> Shutdown	Outage	Outage	Outage
Fuel assemblies loaded in Core	400	548	548	No fuel rods	548	764
Core and Fuel Integrity (Loaded fuel assemblies)		Damaged (35%*1)	Damaged (30%*1)	No fuel rods	Not Da	
Reactor Pressure Vessel structural integrity	Damage and Leakage estimated	Unknown	Unknown	Not Damaged		imaged
Containment Vessel structural integrity	Damage and Leakage estimated	Damage and Leakage Suspected	Not damaged (estimation)	Not Damaged	Not Da	imaged
Core cooling requiring AC power 1 (Large volumetric freshwater injection)	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not necessary	Funct	tional
Core cooling requiring AC power 2 (Cooling through Heat Exchangers)	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not necessary	Funct (in cold s	ioning :hutdown)
Building Integrity	Severely Damaged (Hydrogen Explosion)	Partly opened	Severely Damaged (Hydrogen Explosion)	Severely Damaged (Hydrogen Explosion)	Open a vent hole avoiding hydro	
Water Level of the Rector Pressure Vessel	Lower than the bottom of fuels	Fuel exposed partially or fully	Fuel exposed partially or fully	Safe	Sa	ıfe
Pressure / Temperature of the Reactor Pressure Vessel	Gradually increasing / Gradually decreasing	Unknown / Stable	Unknown / Gradually increasing	Safe	Sa	
Containment Vessel Pressure	Stable	Stable	Stable	Safe	Sa	ife.
Water injection to core (Accident Management)	Continuing(Switch from seawater to	Continuing (Switch from seawater to	Continuing (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Not necessary	Not neo	
	freshwater)	freshwater)				-
Water injection to Containment Vessel (AM)	Feed water to fill up the CV (started 4/27)	Feed water to fill up the CV (planned)	Feed water to fill up the CV (planned)	Not necessary	Not neo	
Containment Venting (AM)	Temporally stopped	Temporally stopped	Temporally stopped	Not necessary	Not neo	
Fuel assemblies stored in Spent Fuel Pool	292	587	514	1331	946	876
Fuel Integrity in the spent fuel pool	Unknown	Unknown	Damage Suspected	some of the spent fuel may have been damaged*3	Not Da	imaged
Cooling of the spent fuel pool	Water spray continues (freshwater)	water injection continues (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Water spray and injection continues (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Water spray and injection continues (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Pool cooling capab	ility was recovered
Main Control Room Habitability & Operability	Poor due to loss of AC power(Lighting and parmaeter monitoring restore	d in the control room at Unit 1 and 3 on Mar. 24th,	at Unit 2 on Mar. 26th, at Unit 4 on Mar. 29th)	Not damage	d (estimate)
Environmental effect Evacuation	 Influence to the people's life Radioactive material was detected from milk, a Radioactive iodine, exceeding the provisional le 10th. Radioactive cesium was detected in the sludge Small amount of strontium was detected in sor Radioactive Cs above the legal limits have been \$\left(1)\$ Shall be evacuated for within 3km from NF \$\left(3)\$ Shall be evacuated for within 20km from NF 	gricultural products and seafood from Fukus gal limit for drinking water, was detected fro from a sewage treatment plants, one of wh ne samples of soil and plants collected in th <u>n detected in tea leaves harvested in some</u> PS, Shall stay indoors for within 10km from N IPS (issued at 18:25, Mar. 12th) <4> Shall s	om tap water sampled in some prefectures. All the re ich is 50 km far from the power station. e area 20-80 km away from the power station. <u>prefectures. The pref governments have asked the m</u> VPS (issued at 21:23, Mar. 11th) <2> Shall be evacua tay indoors (issued at 11:00, Mar. 15th), Should consid	sued order to limit shipment and intake of some products. strictions of intake of the water, which was once issued by th nunicipalities and the local farmers' association to voluntarily ted for within 10km from NPS (issued at 05:44, Mar. 12th) der leaving (issued at 11:30, Mar. 25th) for from 20km to 30km v. People in the expanded zone are ordered to evacuate with	halt shipments.(5/13-) n from NPS 〈5〉The 20	0km evacuation zone
				 People in the expanded zone are ordered to evacuate with ncy (announced on Apr. 11th and issued on Apr. 22nd). 	in a month or so. Peop	ble living in the 20 to
	Level 7*2 Cumulative amount of radioact					
INES(estimated by NISA)			as much as one in the Chernobyl accident so far.	Level 3 *2	—	—
Remarks	Progress of the work to restore cooling function TEPC0 announced its plan to bring the damaged reactors to a stable condition known as a "cold shutdown" in about six to nine months, a situation in which water temperatures inside the reactors have been stably brought below 100 C.(4/17, revised on 5/17) High radiation circumstance hampering the work to restore reactor cooling function at unit-12 and 3. Operation to discharge radioactive water in the basement of the buildings and concrete tunnels outside the buildings of all Unit 1, 2, 3, started with unit 2 on April 19 and counties. Works inside the reactor bldg becomes available after radiation inside were forcibly decreased through air purification. Emergency power generators were moved to higher ground in order to prevent the reactors' acoling systems from failing in case a major tsunami hits the plant again. External power source becomes more reliable after connecting 3 power lines with each other, which are for Unit 1/2, for Unit 3/4 and for Unit 5/6. The damaged containment vessel of unit 1 is a need to be repaired before the work to restore reactor cooling function. TEPC0 developed the plan to cool the reactor through filling the containment vessel with water up to the top of fuel level.(4/17) However, since it turned out that the containment vessel in Unit 1 was leaking as in Unit 2 while there was also risk of leaking in Unit 3. TEPC0 has revised it splan to estable most of water in the building and night to it in tote reactor vessel. (5/17) TEPC0 estimated that fuel pellets would have melted and failen to the bottom of the reactor at Unit 1 in its tentative assessment released on May 15. TEPC0 also predict that an event associated with large amount of radioactive material Lis presumed that radioactive material inside the reactor vessel to may leaked outside. Nitrogen gas injection into the Unit 1 Containment vessel to prevent hydrogen explosion started on April 6th and continues. Preparation oreachine prevent generator as explosion on March 16 had conti					
[Source] Government Nuclear Emergency Response Heado News Release (-5/19 17:00), Press conference NISA: News Release (- <u>5/21 12:00</u>), Press conference TEPCO: Press Release (- <u>5/21 21:00</u>), Press Conference	Worker's exposure dose: 30 workers has been [Abbreviations] quarters: MEXT: Ministry of Education, C INES: International Nuclear Eve NISA: Nuclear and Industrial Sa ence TEPCO: Tokyo Electric Power	exposed to radiation more than 100 mSv as ulture, Sports, Science and Technology nt Scale afety Agency Company, Inc.	 s of 5/11. *Emergency exposure dose limit has been *1 TEPCO's estimation revised on April 27 *2 Correction: Rating was raised from 5 to 7 for *3 It is presumed that some of the spent fuel ma substance detected from the water sample taker *4 TEPCO announced its tentative assessment of 	the accident of Unit 1 through 3 y have been damaged based on radioactive i from the pool of Unit 4.	[Significance judged ■ Low ■ High ■ Severe (Need in	

Power Station	Fukushima Dai-ni Nuclear Power Station				
Unit	1	2	3	4	
Electric / Thermal Power output (MW)	1100 / 3293				
Type of Reactor	BWR-5	BWR-5	BWR-5	BWR-5	
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred		In Service -> Automatic Shutdown			
Status	All the units are in cold shutdown.				
INES (estimated by NISA)	Level 3	Level 3	—	Level 3	
Remarks	Unit-1, 2, 3 & 4, which were in full operation External power supply was available after th unit into cold shutdown state one by one. No parameter has shown abnormality after t Latest Monitor Indication: <u>1.6 μ Sv/h at 21:0</u> Evacuation Area: 3km from NPS(3/12 7:45),	he quake. While injecting water into the reac the earthquake occurred off an shore of Miy <u>00, May 21st</u> at NPS border	ctor pressure vessel using make-up water system, T yagi prefecture at 23:32, Apr. 7th.	EPCO recovered the core cooling function	

Power Station	Onagawa Nuclear Power Station			
Unit	1 2		3	
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service -> Automatic Shutdown			
Status	All the units are in cold shutdown.			
Remarks	3 out of 4 external power lines in service with Miyagi prefecture at 23:32, Apr. 7th. All 5 ext shown no abnormality. All SFP cooling syste	ternal power lines have become available b		

Power Station	Tokai Dai−ni	
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service -> Automatic Shutdown	
Status	In cold shutdown.	
Remarks	No abnormality has been found after an earthquake occurred off the shore of Miyagi prefecture at 23:32, Apr. 7th.	




Parameters in the Table

JAIF picks up these parameters to evaluate safety condition of the nuclear plants during this accident from the view point of the principles of nuclear power plant safety, which are "Shutdown", "Cooling" and "Containment". Then we create the chart. The following diagram is to show the correspondence relation of these parameters in the table to nuclear power plant safety.

	and related items		Parameters in the ta
Reactor Shutdown	a		Operation Status at the earthque
Safety y		1	Core cooling requiring AC power1 (Large volumetric freshwater injection)
	capability	J. I_	Core cooling requiring AC power2 (Cooling through Heat Exchangers)
Containme	nt	Design base 5 Barriers	
	-	Function ①Fuel Pellet ②Cladding Tube	Core and Fuel Integrity
		③Reactor Pressure vessel	✤ Reactor Pressure Vessel Integrity
			Containment Vessel pressure
		③Containment Vessel —	Containment Vessel Integrity
		⑤Reactor Building	Building Integrity
<accident :="" am="" management=""></accident>			Iinjection to core (AM)
(Operation beyond design base accident)	Alternative Cooling operation	┦	Injection to Containment Vessel (A
	operation	Operation for containment vessel protection against burst	Containment Venting (AM)
			Fuel Integrity in the spent fuel pool (Fuel Damage)
Safety of the spent fuel pool			(ruei Damage)
Safety of the spent fuel pool			Cooling of the spent fuel pool (Water injection, pool temp, water la
Safety of the spent fuel pool Work environment in main control	ol room		Cooling of the spent fuel pool
	ol room		Cooling of the spent fuel pool (Water injection, pool temp, water la Main Control Room Habitability an





1. Latest Major event and response

May 19th

1630-19:30 Freshwater was sprayed into the SFP at Unit 4 using concrete pump vehicle.

10:00-11:00 Seven sandbags containing zeolite was placed near the seawater screen between Unit 1 and Unit 2 while other three sandbags being placed near the seawater screen between Unit 3 and Unit 4.

09:00-16:00 Operation of removing debris was conducted using remote-controlled heavy machinary.

10:30-14:00 Operation of spraying synthetic resin was conducted to prevent scatter of radioactive materials.

May 20th

15:06-16:15 Freshwater was sprayed into the SFP at Unit 1 using concrete pump vehicle.

09:00-16:00 Operation of removing debris was conducted using remote-controlled heavy machinary.

10:30-14:00 Operation of spraying synthetic resin was conducted to prevent scatter of radioactive materials.

<u>May 21st</u>

09:35 "Mega float", a giant storage barge, arrived at the port of Fukushima Daiich NPS.

14:00- Accumulated water in the basement of Unit 6 T/B was transferred to a makeshift tank.

2. Chronology of Nuclear Power Stations

	Unit 1		Unit 3	Unit 4	Unit-5 and 6
lajor Incidents and Actions	11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of power)	11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of power)	11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of power)	14th 04:08 Water temperature in Spent Fuel Storage Pool increased at 84°C	19th 05:00 Cooling SFP with RHR-pump started at Unit 5
The Act on Special	11th 16:36 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Incapability of water injection by core cooling function)	11th 16:36 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Incapability of water injection by core cooling function)	12th 20:41 Start venting	15th 09:38 Fire occurred on 3rd floor (extinguished spontaneously)	19th 22:14 Cooling SFP with RHR-pump started at Unit 6
luclear Emergency Preparedness	12th 00:49 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Abnormal rise of CV pressure)	13th 11:00 Start venting 14th 13:25 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Loss of reactor	13th 05:10 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Loss of reactor cooling functions)	16th 05:45 Fire occurred (extinguished spontaneously) Since 20th, operation of spraying water to the	20th 14:30 Cold shutdown achieved at Unit 5. 20th 19:27 Cold shutdown achieved at Unit 6. 22nd 19:41 All power source was switched to external AC
	12th 14:30 Start venting 12th 15:36 Hydrogen explosion	cooling functions) 14th 16:34 Seawater injection to RPV	13th 08:41 Start venting 13th 13:12 Seawater injection to RPV	spent fuel pool continues. 29th 11:50 lights in the main control room	power at Unit 5 and 6.
	12th 20:20 Seawater injection to RPV	14th 22:50 Report IAW Article 15* (Abnormal rise of CV pressure)	14th 05:20 Start venting	becomes available	Apr. 1st 13:40 Start transferring pooled water in the Unit
	22nd 11:20 RPV temperature increased	15th 00:02 Start venting	14th 07:44 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Abnormal rise of CV pressure)	Apr. 13 13:50 Installation of silt fences in front of the Unit 3 and 4 seawater screen completed	radioactive waste process facility to the Unit 5 condense
	22nd 02:33 Seawater injection through feed water line started in addition to fire extinguish line	15th 06:10 Sound of explosion, Suppression Pool damage suspected	14th 11:01 Hydrogen explosion	May 5 12:19 Operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool with concrete pump truck	May1 14:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift
	24th 11:30 lights in the main control room becomes available	15th 08:25 White smoke reeked	15th 10:22 Radiation dose 400mSv/h	conducted.	tank started.
	25th 15:37 Freshwater injection to the reactor started.	20th 15:05 operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool started.	16th 08:34, 10:00 White smoke reeked		IVIAY2 10:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.
	27th 08:30 Continuing to transfer the water in the basement of the turbine building	26th 10:10 Freshwater injection to the reactor started.	Since 17th, operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool continues.		May 2 11:03 The Residual heat removal pump temporal stopped while start up transformer testing
	31st 09:20-11:25 Work to remove the water in the trench	26th 16:46 lights in the main control room becomes available	21st 15:55 Slightly gray smoke erupted (18:02 settled)	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	May3 14:00 The operation of transformer teams accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.
	31st 12:00 Start to transfer the water in the CST to the surge tank (- 15:27, Apr. 2)	29th 16:45 Start to transfer the water in the CST to the surge tank	22nd 22:46 lights in the main control room becomes available	conducted.	
	31st 13:03 Start water injection to SFP	Apr. 2nd 16:25 Start injecting concrete to stop water leakage from the pit near the intake	25th 18:02 Freshwater injection to the reactor started.	May 9 16:05 Operation of spraying water to the	May7 10:00 The operation of transferring water
	Apr. 3rd 12:18 Switch power supply for water injection pumps to the RPV from power supply vehicles to originally equipped power source	Apr. 2nd 17:10 Start transferring water in the condencer to the CST	28th 17:40 Start to transfer the water in the CST to the surge tank		accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.
	Apr. 7th 01:31 Injection of Nitrogen gas started after opening all valves through the line.	Apr. 3rd 12:18 Switch power supply for water injection pumps to the RPV from power supply vehicles to originally equipped power source	Apr. 3rd 12:18 Switch power supply for water injection pumps to the RPV from power supply vehicles to originally equipped power source		May9 14:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.
	Apr. 10th 09:30 Transfer of water from the main condenser to the CST completed.	Apr. 5th 15:07 Regarding leakage from the pit that is closed to discharge outlet of unit-2, hardening agent was injected to hole dug surrounding the pit. (Apr. 6 05:38 It was confirmed that water flow stopped	Apr. 13 13:50 Installation of silt fances in front of the	May 13 16:04 Operation of spraying water to	May10 10:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.
	Apr. 14 12:20 Installation of silt fences in front of the Unit 1and 2 seawater screen and intake completed	Apr. 9th 13:10 Transfer of water from the main condenser to the CST completed.	Apr 17 11:30 Start investigation of the inside of R/B using a remote-controlled robot.		May10 11:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in reactor bldg of unit-6 to the waste processing facility conducted.
	Apr 17 16:00 Start investigation of the inside of R/B using a remote-controlled robot.	Apr. 13th 17:04 Transfer of highly radioactively contaminated wafter accumulated in the trench outside the turbine building to the condenser completed	May 8 12:10 Water injected the SFP by temporally installed motor driven pump conducted.		May11 10:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.
	Apr. 29 11:36 The inside of the building was inspected. It was confirmed that there is no water significant leakage from the CV.	Apr. 14 12:20 Installation of silt fences in front of the Unit 1and 2 seawater screen and intake completed	May 9 12:14 Water injected the SFP by originally installed clean up system conducted.		May11 11:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in reactor bldg of unit-6 to the waste processing facility conducted.
	May 2 12:58 Water feeding was temporally switched from to the reactor injection pump to the fire pump to install alarm device to the reactor injection pump.	Apr. 15th 14:15 Installation of steel plate in front of Unit 2 seawater screen completed	May 15 14:33 180kg of boric acid injection to No3 Reactor started.		May12 10:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.
	May 5 11:32-16:36 Ventilators to clean the highly radioactive air inside the reactor building were installed and started.	Apr 18 13:42 Start investigation of the inside of R/B using a remote- controlled robot.	May 16 15:00 Water injection by temporally installed motor driven pump started.		May12 10:30 The operation of transferring water accumulated in reactor bldg of unit-6 to the waste processing facility conducted.
	May 11 08:58 N2 injection to the CV temporally stopped while the work for restoring one of external power sources being conducted. It resumed later.	Apr. 19 10:08 Start transferring highly radioactive water accumulated in the turbine building and the concrete tunnel to the waste processing facility			May13 10:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.
	May 12 05:00 Instrumental reading of the water gage of the reactor No1 went off the scale on the lower side after adjusting the gage.	Apr. 30 14:05 Start transferring highly radioactive water accumulated in the vertical part of the concrete tunnel outside the turbine BLDG to the waste processing facility			May 13 11:00 Water accumulated in the room for high pressure injection system room discharged to other space
		May 1 13:35 The work to block the vertical concrete tunnel outside the turbine bldg started. May 2 12:58 Water feeding was temporally switched from to the reactor injection pump to the fire pump to install alarm device to the reactor injection pump.			May14 10:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.
		May 6 09:36 Water injected the SFP conducted			Mav15 10:00 The operation of transferring water

as of 15:00, May 21st



		tunnel outside turbine bldgtto he waste processing facility temporally stopped while piping work for feeding water into the reactor being			accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.
		May 10 13:09 Water injected the SFP conducted			May16 10:00 The operation of transferring water
		May 12 15:20 Operation of discharging water accumulated in the concrete tunnel outside turbine bldg to the waste processing facility temporally restarted,			accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.
		May 14 13:00 Water injection to the SFP was done			
Major Data *1	Reactor Water level (May 21 11:00) (A) (Lower beyond lower end of the gauge , (B) -1550mm	Reactor Water level (May 21 11:00) (A) -1500mm, (B) -2100mm	Reactor Water level (May 21 11:00) (A) -1800mm, (B) -2300mm	SFP water temperature measured with a concrete pump vehicle Apr. 12 : about 90 °C	Water temperature of SFP Unit 5 43.8°C (May 21 12:00) Unit 6 38.5°C (May 21 12:00)
	Reactor pressure (May 21 11:00) (A) 0.528MPaG, (B) 1.423MPaG*2	Reactor pressure (May 21 11:00) (A) -0.018MPaG*2, (B) -0.016MPaG*2	Reactor pressure (May 21 11:00) (A) -0.100MPaG*2, (B) -0.089MPaG*2		
	CV pressure (May 21 11:00) 0.1317MPaabs	CV pressure (May 21 11:00) 0.040MPaabs	CV pressure (May 21 11:00) 0.1010MPaabs	22 before spray: about 91 °C	
	RPV temperature (May 21 11:00) 112.9°C*2 at feed water line nozzle	RPV temperature (May 21 11:00) 112.3°C at feed water line nozzle Water temperature in SFP (May 21 11:00) 49.0 °C	RPV temperature (May 21 11:00) 111.2°C*2 at feed water line nozzle	23 before spray: about 83 °C 23 after spray : about 66 °C 24 before spray: about 86 °C	
	Thermography (Apr. 26 23:00) CV: 25°C, SFP: 23°C	Thermography (Apr. 26 07:30) Top of R/B: 24°C	Thermography (Apr. 26 07:30) CV: 26°C, SFP: 56°C	24 after spray : about 81 °C	

(2) Fukushima Dai-ni NPPs

All units are cold shutdown (Unit-1, 2, 4 have been recovered from a event falling under Article 15*)

3. State of Emergency Declaration

11th 19:03 State of nuclear emergency was declared (Fukushima Dai-ni NPS) 12th 07:45 State of nuclear emergency was declared (Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS)

4. Evacuation Order

11th 21:23 PM direction: for the residents within 3km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate, within 10km radius from Fukushima I to stay in-house

12th 05:44 PM direction: for the residents within 10km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate

12th 17:39 PM direction: for the residents within 10km radius from Fukushima II to evacuate

12th 18:25 PM direction: for the residents within 20km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate

15th 11:06 PM direction: for the residents within 20-30km radius from Fukushima I to stay in-house


25th Governmental advise: for the residents within 20-30 km radius from Fukushima I to voluntarily evacuate

Abbreviations:
SFP: Spent Fuel Storage Pool
EDG: Emergency Diesel Generator
RPV: Reactor Pressure Vessel
R/B: Reactor Building
RHR: Residual Heat Removal system
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CST: Condensate water Storage Tank

T/B: Turbine Building





*1 Trend data of primary parameters are available at Japan Nuclear Technology Institute's Home Page; "http://www.gengikyo.jp/english/shokai/special_4.html" *2 Data trend is continuously monitored.

