Information on Status of Nuclear Power Plants in Fukushima



Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.

Policy on information and compilation

This JAIF-compiled information chart represents the situation, phenomena, and operations in which JAIF estimates and guesses the reactors and related facilities are, based on the latest data and information directly and indirectly made available by the relevant organizations when JAIF's updating works done. Consequently, JAIF may make necessary changes to descriptions in the chart, once (1) new developments have occurred in the status of reactors and facilities and (2) JAIF has judged so needed after reexamining the prior information and judgments.

JAIF will do its best to keep tracks on the information on the nuclear power plants quickly and accurately.

Status of nuclear power plants in Fukushima as of 12:00, May 9th (Estimated by JAIF)

Power Station			Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Stati	ion		
Unit	1	2	3	4	5	6
Electric / Thermal Power output (MW)	460 / 1380	784 / 2381	784 / 2381	784 / 2381	784 / 2381	1100 /3293
Type of Reactor	BWR-3	BWR-4	BWR-4	BWR-4	BWR-4	BWR-5
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service -> Shutdown	In Service -> Shutdown	In Service -> Shutdown	Outage	Outage	Outage
Fuel assemblies loaded in Core	400	548	548	No fuel rods	548	764
		Damaged (35%*1)			Not Da	
Core and Fuel Integrity (Loaded fuel assemblies)		Unknown	Damaged (30%*1)	No fuel rods	Not Da	
Reactor Pressure Vessel structural integrity	Unknown		Unknown	Not Damaged		
Containment Vessel structural integrity	Not Damaged (estimation)	Damage and Leakage Suspected	Not damaged (estimation)	Not Damaged	Not Da	maged
Core cooling requiring AC power 1 (Large volumetric freshwater injection)	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not necessary	Funct	
Core cooling requiring AC power 2 (Cooling through Heat Exchangers)	Not Functional Not Functional Not Functional Not Functional Not necessary				Functi (in cold s	
Building Integrity	Severely Damaged (Hydrogen Explosion)	Slightly Damaged	Severely Damaged (Hydrogen Explosion)	Severely Damaged (Hydrogen Explosion)	Open a vent hole on the rooftop for avoiding hydrogen explosion	
Water Level of the Rector Pressure Vessel	Fuel exposed partially or fully	Fuel exposed partially or fully	Fuel exposed partially or fully	Safe	Sa	fe
Pressure / Temperature of the Reactor Pressure	Gradually increasing / Decreased a little					
Vessel	after increasing over 400°C on Mar. 24th Decreased a little after increasing up to	Unknown / Stable	Unknown / Gradually increasing	Safe	Sa	fe
Containment Vessel Pressure	0.4Mpa on Mar. 24th	Stable	Stable	Safe	Sa	fe
Water injection to core (Accident Management)	Continuing (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Continuing (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Continuing (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Not necessary	Not nec	
Water injection to Containment Vessel (AM)	Feed water to fill up the CV (started 4/27)	Feed water to fill up the CV (planned)	Feed water to fill up the CV (planned)	Not necessary	Not nec	
Containment Venting (AM)	Temporally stopped	Temporally stopped	Temporally stopped	Not necessary	Not nec	essary
Fuel assemblies stored in Spent Fuel Pool	292	587	514	1331	946	876
Fuel Integrity in the spent fuel pool	Unknown	Unknown	Damage Suspected	some of the spent fuel may have been damaged*3	Not Da	
Cooling of the spent fuel pool	Water spray continues (freshwater)		Water spray and injection continues (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Water spray and injection continues (Switch from seawater to freshwater), Hydrogen from the pool exploded (3/15)	Pool cooling capabi	
Main Control Room Habitability & Operability	Poor due to loss of AC power (Poor due to loss of AC power (Lighting and parmaeter monitoring restored in the control room at Unit 1 and 3 on Mar. 24th, at Unit 2 on Mar. 26th, at Unit 4 on Mar. 29th) Not damaged (estimate)				
Environmental effect	Radioactive materials continues to be detected in samples corrected from underground water and sea water at or near the site. Environmental monitoring has been enhanced. Radioactive Iodine and cesium have been detected in the seabed samples taken 15–20 km far from the plant from 15–20m deep. Level of radiation is 100 to 1,000 times above normal. (5/4) Influence to the people's life Radioactive material was detected from milk, agricultural products and seafood from Fukushima and neighboring prefectures. The government issued order to limit shipment and intake of some products. Radioactive iodine, exceeding the provisional legal limit for drinking water, was detected from tap water sampled in some prefectures. Radioactive cesium was detected in the sludge from a sewage treatment plant 50 km far from the power station. Small amount of strontium was detected in some samples of soil and plants corrected in the area that is 20–80 km far from the power station.					
Evacuation	Shall be evacuated for within 3km from NPS, Shall stay indoors for within 10km from NPS (issued at 21:23, Mar. 11th) (3) Shall be evacuated for within 20km from NPS (issued at 18:25, Mar. 12th) (4) Shall be evacuated for within 20km from NPS (issued at 18:25, Mar. 12th) (4) Shall stay indoors (issued at 11:00, Mar. 15th), Should consider leaving (issued at 11:30, Mar. 25th) for from 20km to 30km from NPS (5) The 20km evacuation zone around the Fukushima Daiichi NPS is to be expanded so as to include the area, where annual radiation exposure is expected to be above 20mSv. People in the expanded zone are ordered to evacuate within a month or so. People living in the 20 to 30km and other than the expanded evacuation area mentioned above, are asked to get prepared for staying indoors or evacuation in an emergency (announced on Apr. 11th and issued on Apr. 22nd).					
INES (estimated by NISA)		the environment in this accident is one tenth	hed the level to be classified as level 7. as much as one in the Chernobyl accident so far.	Level 3 *2	_	_
	Progress of the work to restore cooling function TEPCO announced its plan to bring the damaged reactors to a stable condition known as a "cold shutdown" in about six to nine months, a situation in which water temperatures inside the reactors have been stably brought below 100 C.(4/17) High radiation circumstance hampering the work to restore reactor cooling function at unit-1,2 and 3. Operation to discharge radioactive water in the basement of the buildings and concrete tunnels outside the buildings of all Unit 1, 2, 3, started with unit 2 on April 19 and counties. Blocking the concrete tunnel was started at Unit 2,(5/1-) Ventilators were installed at Unit 1(5/5), to clean the highly radioactive air inside the reactor building for improving working environment. The doors of the building were opened (5/8) and workers entered the building (5/9). Emergency power generators were moved to higher ground in order to prevent the reactors' cooling systems from failing in case a major tsunami hits the plant again. External power source becomes more reliable after connecting 3 power lines with each other, which are for Unit 1/2, for Unit 3/4 and for Unit 5/6. The damaged containment vessel of unit 2 is need to be repaired before the work to restore reactor cooling function. TEPCO developed the plan to cool the reactor through filling the containment vessel with water up to the top of fuel level. NISA accepted TEPCO's safety evaluation for this plan for unit 1 such as impact of increased dead weight of water.(5/5) The operation of pumping more water into No1 reactor in line with this plan continues. Punction of containing radioactive material inside the reactor vessel may leaked outside. NISA estimated that the reactor pressure vessel of Unit 2 and 3 may have lost air tightness. Nitrogen gas injection into the Unit 1 containment vessel to prevent hydrogen explosion started on April 6th and continues. Cooling the spent fuel pool (SFP) Injecting and/or spraying water to the SFP continues for the purpose cooling and m					
Remarks	TEPCO developed the plan to cool the reactor. The operation of pumping more water into No1 Function of containing radioactive material. It is presumed that radioactive material inside. Nitrogen gas injection into the Unit 1 containing. Cooling the spent fuel pool (SFP) Injecting and/or spraying water to the SFP containing the walls of the reactor building supporting the Prevention of the proliferation of radioactive TEPCO announced the plans to prevent radioactive full operation of spraying synthetic resin to contain the proliferation of the proliferation to contain the proliferation of the proliferation of radioactive full operation of spraying synthetic resin to contain the proliferation of the proliferation to contain the plans to prevent radioactive full operation of spraying synthetic resin to contain the plans to prevent radioactive full operation of spraying synthetic resin to contain the plans to prevent radioactive full operation of spraying synthetic resin to contain the plans to prevent radioactive full operation of spraying synthetic resin to contain the plans to prevent radioactive full operation of spraying synthetic resin to contain the plans to prevent radioactive full operation of spraying synthetic resin to contain the plans to prevent radioactive full the plans to prevent radioacti	through filling the containment vessel with reactor in line with this plan continues. the reactor vessel may leaked outside. NISA ent vessel to prevent hydrogen explosion stational transfer the purpose cooling and make up to pool were severely damaged by an explosively contaminated substance: actively contaminated water, dust and soil and antain contaminated dust started on Apr. 26	A estimated that the reactor pressure vessel of Unit 2 arted on April 6th and continues. O water evaporated. On on March 15th at unit-4. Work for structural reinformed radioactive material itself existing on site from spre	and 3 may have lost air tightness. recement to support the SFP is necessary. ading on Apr 17.	t of increased dead weig	tht of water.(5/5)

Government Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters: News Release (-5/8 17:00), Press conference NISA: News Release (-5/8 12:00), Press conference TEPCO: Press Release (-5/9 09:00), Press Conference

MEXT: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology INES: International Nuclear Event Scale NISA: Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency TEPCO: Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc. NSC: Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan

- *1 TEPCO's estimation revised on April 27
- *2 Correction: Rating was raised from 5 to 7 for the accident of Unit 1 through 3
- *3 It is presumed that some of the spent fuel may have been damaged based on radioactive substance detected from the water sample taken from the pool of Unit 4.

[Significance judged by JAIF]

Low

High

Severe (Need immediate action)


Power Station	Fukushima Dai-ni Nuclear Power Station			
Unit	1	2	3	4
Electric / Thermal Power output (MW)	1100 / 3293			
Type of Reactor	BWR-5	BWR-5	BWR-5	BWR-5
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service → Automatic Shutdown			
Status	All the units are in cold shutdown.			
INES (estimated by NISA)	Level 3	Level 3	_	Level 3
Remarks	Unit-1, 2, 3 & 4, which were in full operation when the earthquake occurred, all shutdown automatically. External power supply was available after the quake. While injecting water into the reactor pressure vessel using make-up water system, TEPCO recovered the core cooling function and made the unit into cold shutdown state one by one. No parameter has shown abnormality after the earthquake occurred off an shore of Miyagi prefecture at 23:32, Apr. 7th. Latest Monitor Indication: 1.7 µ Sv/h at 21:00, May 7th at NPS border Evacuation Area: 3km from NPS(3/12 7:45), 10km from NPS(3/12 17:39), 8km from NPS(4/21)			

Power Station	Onagawa Nuclear Power Station			
Unit	1 2 3		3	
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service → Automatic Shutdown			
Status	All the units are in cold shutdown.			
	3 out of 4 external power lines in service with another line under construction broke down after an earthquake occurred off the shore Miyagi prefecture at 23:32, Apr. 7th. All 5 external power lines have become available by Apr. 10th. Monitoring posts' readings have shown no abnormality. All SFP cooling systems had been restored after shutting down due to the earthquake.			

Power Station	Tokai Dai−ni
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service -> Automatic Shutdown
Status	In cold shutdown.
Remarks	No abnormality has been found after an earthquake occurred off the shore of Miyagi prefecture at 23:32, Apr. 7th.

Parameters in the Table

JAIF picks up these parameters to evaluate safety condition of the nuclear plants during this accident from the view point of the principles of nuclear power plant safety, which are "Shutdown", "Cooling" and "Containment". Then we create the chart. The following diagram is to show the correspondence relation of these parameters in the table to nuclear power plant safety.



Accidents of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Stations

May 6th

09:00-16:00 Operation to remove rubble by remotely controlled heavy machines conducted today.

09:00-16:00 Operation of spraying synthetic resin to prevent contaminated dust and soil from spreading was conducted.

12:38-17:51 Operation of spraying water to the Unit 4 SFP was conducted

14:00-17:00 Water accumulated in the basement of Unit 6 was transferred to makeshift storage tanks.

May 7th

09:00-16:00 Operation to remove rubble by remotely controlled heavy machines conducted today.

10:30-14:00 Operation of spraying synthetic resin to prevent contaminated dust and soil from spreading was conducted.

14:05-17:30 Operation of spraying water to the Unit 4 SFP was conducted

10:00-15:00 Water accumulated in the basement of Unit 6 was transferred to makeshift storage tanks.

2. Chronology of Nuclear Power Stations

1. Latest Major event and response

(1)	Fukushima	Dai-ichi N	PS

Unit 1 11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of power)	Unit 2	Unit 3	Unit 4	Unit-5 and 6
	11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of power)	11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of power)	14th 04:08 Water temperature in Spent Fuel Storage Pool increased at 84°C	19th 05:00 Cooling SFP with RHR-pump started
	11th 16:36 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Incapability of water injection	12th 20:41 Start venting	15th 09:38 Fire occurred on 3rd floor (extinguished	at Unit 5 19th 22:14 Cooling SFP with RHR-pump started
	by core cooling function)		spontaneously)	at Unit 6 20th 14:30 Cold shutdown achieved at Unit 5.
(Abnormal rise of CV pressure)	,	reactor cooling functions)	spontaneously)	20th 19:27 Cold shutdown achieved at Unit 6.
12th 14:30 Start venting	,	13th 08:41 Start venting		22nd 19:41 All power source was switched to
12th 15:36 Hydrogen explosion	14th 16:34 Seawater injection to RPV	13th 13:12 Seawater injection to RPV		external AC power at Unit 5 and 6.
12th 20:20 Seawater injection to RPV	14th 22:50 Report IAW Article 15* (Abnormal rise of CV pressure)	14th 05:20 Start venting	available	Apr. 1st 13:40 Start transferring pooled water in
22nd 11:20 RPV temperature increased	15th 00:02 Start venting			the Unit 6 radioactive waste process facility to the Unit 5 condenser.
started in addition to fire extinguish line	15th 06:10 Sound of explosion, Suppression Pool damage suspected	14th 11:01 Hydrogen explosion		May2 10:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank started.
24th 11:30 lights in the main control room becomes available	15th 08:25 White smoke reeked	15th 10:22 Radiation dose 400mSv/h		
25th 15:37 Freshwater injection to the reactor started.	20th 15:05 operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool started.	16th 08:34, 10:00 White smoke reeked		
27th 08:30 Continuing to transfer the water in the basement of the turbine building	26th 10:10 Freshwater injection to the reactor started.	Since 17th, operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool continues.		
31st 09:20-11:25 Work to remove the water in the trench	26th 16:46 lights in the main control room becomes available	21st 15:55 Slightly gray smoke erupted (18:02 settled)		
31st 12:00 Start to transfer the water in the CST to the surge tank (- 15:27, Apr. 2)	29th 16:45 Start to transfer the water in the CST to the surge tank	22nd 22:46 lights in the main control room becomes available		
31st 13:03 Start water injection to SFP	Apr. 2nd 16:25 Start injecting concrete to stop water leakage from the pit near the intake	25th 18:02 Freshwater injection to the reactor started.		
Apr. 7th 01:31 Injection of Nitrogen gas started after opening all valves through the line.	2nd 17:10 Start transferring water in the conden4er to the CST	28th 17:40 Start to transfer the water in the CST to the surge tank		
		Apr. 13 13:50 Installation of silt fences in front of the Unit 3 a	nd 4 seawater screen completed	
using a remote-controlled robot.	Apr. 9th 13:10 Transfer of water from the main condenser to the CST completed.	Apr 17 11:30 Start investigation of the inside of R/B using a remote-controlled robot.		
It was confirmed that there is no water significant				
May 2 12:58 Water feeding was temporally switched from to the reactor injection pump to the fire pump to install alarm device to the reactor injection pump.	Apr. 15th 14:15 Installation of steel plate in front of Unit 2 seawater screen completed			
radioactive air inside the reactor building were installed at Unit 1.	Apr 18 13:42 Start investigation of the inside of R/B using a remote-controlled robot.			
	building and the concrete tunnel to the waste processing facility			
	Apr. 30 14:05 Start transferring highly radioactive water accumulated in the vertical			
Apr. 3rd 12:18 Switch power supply for water injection p	umps to the RPV from power supply vehicles to originally equipped power source	J		
			SED water temperature measured with a constate	Water temperature of SFP
			<u> </u>	Unit 5 40.8°C (May 8 12:00)
(A) <u>0.455</u> MPaG, (B) <u>1.290</u> MPaG*2	(A) <u>-0.020</u> MPaG*2, (B) <u>-0.018</u> MPaG*2	(A) <u>-0.081</u> MPaG*2, (B) <u>-0.087</u> MPaG*2	Apr. 12 : about 90 °C	Unit 6 29.0°C (May 8 12:00)
CV pressure (May <u>8 11:00</u>) <u>0.120</u> MPaabs	CV pressure (May 8 11:00) 0.060MPaabs	CV pressure (May <u>8 11:00</u>) <u>0.1015</u> MPaabs	22 before spray: about 91°C	
RPV temperature (May 8 11:00)		RPV temperature (May 8 11:00)	23 before spray: about 83°C	
118.4°C*2 at feed water line nozzle		206.2°C*2 at feed water line nozzle		
	Thermography (Apr. 26 07:30)	Thermography (Apr. 26 07:30)	24 after spray: about 86°C 24 after spray: about 81°C	
	(Abnormal rise of CV pressure) 12th 14:30 Start venting 12th 15:36 Hydrogen explosion 12th 20:20 Seawater injection to RPV 22nd 11:20 RPV temperature increased 22nd 02:33 Seawater injection through feed water line started in addition to fire extinguish line 24th 11:30 lights in the main control room becomes available 25th 15:37 Freshwater injection to the reactor started. 27th 08:30 Continuing to transfer the water in the basement of the turbine building 31st 09:20-11:25 Work to remove the water in the trench 31st 12:00 Start to transfer the water in the CST to the surge tank (- 15:27, Apr. 2) 31st 13:03 Start water injection to SFP Apr. 7th 01:31 Injection of Nitrogen gas started after opening all valves through the line. Apr. 10th 09:30 Transfer of water from the main condenser to the CST completed. Apr 17 16:00 Start investigation of the inside of R/B using a remote-controlled robot. Apr. 29 11:36 The inside of the building was inspected. It was confirmed that there is no water significant leakage from the CV. May 2 12:58 Water feeding was temporally switched from to the reactor injection pump to the fire pump to install alarm device to the reactor injection pump. May 5 11:32-16:36 Ventilators to clean the highly radioactive air inside the reactor building were installed at Unit 1. Apr. 3rd 12:18 Switch power supply for water injection p paper. Apr. 3rd 12:18 Switch power supply for water injection paper. Apr. 3rd 12:18 Switch power supply for water injection paper. Apr. 3rd 12:18 Switch power supply for water injection paper. Apr. 3rd 12:18 Switch power supply for water injection paper. Apr. 3rd 12:18 Switch power supply for water injection paper. Apr. 3rd 12:18 Switch power supply for water injection paper. Apr. 3rd 12:18 Switch power supply for water injection paper. Apr. 3rd 12:18 Switch power supply for water injection paper. Apr. 3rd 12:18 Switch power supply for water injection paper. Apr. 3rd 12:18 Switch power supply for water injection paper.	Abnormal rise of CV pressure	Absorbance like of CV pressure) 14th 13:25 Event falling under Ancide 15' occurred (Loss of reactor cooling under the under in the CST to the surge task (15' 25' 25' 25' 25' 25' 25' 25' 25' 25' 2	About the set of Cyr Instaure 1

as of 17:00, May 8th



(2) Fukushima Dai-ni NPPs

All units are cold shutdown (Unit-1, 2, 4 have been recovered from a event falling under Article 15*)

3. State of Emergency Declaration

11th 19:03 State of nuclear emergency was declared (Fukushima Dai-ni NPS)

12th 07:45 State of nuclear emergency was declared (Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS)

4. Evacuation Order

11th 21:23 PM direction: for the residents within 3km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate, within 10km radius from Fukushima I to stay in-house

12th 05:44 $\,$ PM direction: for the residents within 10km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate

12th 17:39 PM direction: for the residents within 10km radius from Fukushima II to evacuate

12th 18:25 PM direction: for the residents within 20km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate

15th 11:06 PM direction: for the residents within 20-30km radius from Fukushima I to stay in-house

25th Governmental advise: for the residents within 20-30 km radius from Fukushima I to voluntarily evacuate

Abbreviations:

SFP: Spent Fuel Storage Pool

EDG: Emergency Diesel Generator

RPV: Reactor Pressure Vessel R/B: Reactor Building

RHR: Residual Heat Removal system

CST: Condensate water Storage Tank

T/B: Turbine Building

*1 Trend data of primary parameters are available at Japan Nuclear

Technology Institute's Home Page;

"http://www.gengikyo.jp/english/shokai/special_4.html".

*2 Data trend is continuously monitored.



