

# Information on Status of Nuclear Power Plants in Fukushima



Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.

## Policy on information and compilation

This JAIF-compiled information chart represents the situation, phenomena, and operations in which JAIF estimates and guesses the reactors and related facilities are, based on the latest data and information directly and indirectly made available by the relevant organizations when JAIF's updating works done. Consequently, JAIF may make necessary changes to descriptions in the chart, once (1) new developments have occurred in the status of reactors and facilities and (2) JAIF has judged so needed after reexamining the prior information and judgments.

JAIF will do its best to keep tracks on the information on the nuclear power plants quickly and accurately.

**Status of nuclear power plants in Fukushima as of 12:00, May 26th (Estimated by JAIF)**

Power Station	Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Unit	1	2	3	4	5	6
Electric / Thermal Power output (MW)	460 / 1380	784 / 2381	784 / 2381	784 / 2381	784 / 2381	1100 / 3293
Type of Reactor	BWR-3	BWR-4	BWR-4	BWR-4	BWR-4	BWR-5
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service → Shutdown	In Service → Shutdown	In Service → Shutdown	Outage	Outage	Outage
Fuel assemblies loaded in Core	400	548	548	No fuel rods	548	764
Core and Fuel Integrity (Loaded fuel assemblies)	Damaged (core melt*2)	Damaged (core melt*2)	Damaged (core melt*2)	No fuel rods	Not Damaged	
Reactor Pressure Vessel structural integrity	Limited Damage and Leakage	Unknown	Unknown	Not Damaged	Not Damaged	
Containment Vessel structural integrity	Damage and Leakage Suspected	Damage and Leakage Suspected	Damage and Leakage Suspected	Not Damaged	Not Damaged	
Core cooling requiring AC power 1 (Large volumetric freshwater injection)	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not necessary	Functional	
Core cooling requiring AC power 2 (Cooling through Heat Exchangers)	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not necessary	Functioning (in cold shutdown)	
Building Integrity	Severely Damaged (Hydrogen Explosion)	Partly opened	Severely Damaged (Hydrogen Explosion)	Severely Damaged (Hydrogen Explosion)	Open a vent hole on the rooftop for avoiding hydrogen explosion	
Water Level of the Rector Pressure Vessel	Lower than the bottom of fuels	Fuel exposed partially or fully	Fuel exposed partially or fully	Safe	Safe	
Pressure / Temperature of the Reactor Pressure Vessel	Gradually increasing / Gradually decreasing	Unknown / Stable	Unknown / Gradually decreasing after an increase	Safe	Safe	
Containment Vessel Pressure	Stable	Stable	Stable	Safe	Safe	
Water injection to core (Accident Management)	Continuing (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Continuing (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Continuing (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Not necessary	Not necessary	
Water injection to Containment Vessel (AM)	Feed water to fill up the CV (started 4/27)	Feed water to fill up the CV (planned)	Feed water to fill up the CV (planned)	Not necessary	Not necessary	
Containment Venting (AM)	Temporarily stopped	Temporarily stopped	Temporarily stopped	Not necessary	Not necessary	
Fuel assemblies stored in Spent Fuel Pool	292	587	514	1331	946	876
Fuel Integrity in the spent fuel pool	Unknown	Unknown	Damage Suspected	No severe damage suspected*1	Not Damaged	
Cooling of the spent fuel pool	Water spray continues (freshwater)	water injection continues (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Water spray and injection continues (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Water spray and injection continues (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Pool cooling capability was recovered	
Main Control Room Habitability & Operability	Poor due to loss of AC power (Lighting and parameter monitoring restored in the control room at Unit 1 and 3 on Mar. 24th, at Unit 2 on Mar. 26th, at Unit 4 on Mar. 29th)				Not damaged (estimate)	
Environmental effect	<p>●Status in Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS site Radiation level: 381 μSv/h at the south side of the office building, 15 μSv/h at the West gate, as of 09:00, May 26th, 42 μSv/h at the Main gate, as of 10:30, May 21st. Some radioactive nuclides (I, Cs, Pu, Am Cm and Sr) has been detected in soil sampled at the Fukushima site. Radioactive materials continues to be detected in samples collected from underground water and sea water at or near the site. Environmental monitoring has been enhanced. Radioactive Iodine and cesium have been detected in the seabed samples taken 15-20 km far from the plant from 15-20m deep. Level of radiation is 100 to 1,000 times above normal. (5/4)</p> <p>●Influence to the people's life Radioactive material was detected from milk, agricultural products and seafood from Fukushima and neighboring prefectures. The government issued order to limit shipment and intake of some products. Radioactive iodine, exceeding the provisional legal limit for drinking water, was detected from tap water sampled in some prefectures. All the restrictions of intake of the water, which was once issued by the government, have been lifted by May 10th. Radioactive cesium was detected in the sludge from a sewage treatment plants, one of which is 50 km far from the power station. Small amount of strontium was detected in some samples of soil and plants collected in the area 20-80 km away from the power station. Radioactive Cs above the legal limits have been detected in tea leaves harvested in some prefectures. The prefect governments have asked the municipalities and the local farmers' association to voluntarily halt shipments.(5/13-)</p>					
Evacuation	<p>&lt;1&gt; Shall be evacuated for within 3km from NPS, Shall stay indoors for within 10km from NPS (issued at 21:23, Mar. 11th) &lt;2&gt; Shall be evacuated for within 10km from NPS (issued at 05:44, Mar. 12th) &lt;3&gt; Shall be evacuated for within 20km from NPS (issued at 18:25, Mar. 12th) &lt;4&gt; Shall stay indoors (issued at 11:00, Mar. 15th), Should consider leaving (issued at 11:30, Mar. 25th) for from 20km to 30km from NPS &lt;5&gt;The 20km evacuation zone around the Fukushima Daiichi NPS is to be expanded so as to include the area, where annual radiation exposure is expected to be above 20mSv. People in the expanded zone are ordered to evacuate within a month or so. People living in the 20 to 30km and other than the expanded evacuation area mentioned above, are asked to get prepared for staying indoors or evacuation in an emergency (announced on Apr. 11th and issued on Apr. 22nd).</p>					
INES (estimated by NISA)	Level 7*2 ※Cumulative amount of radioactivity from Fukushima Daiichi NPS has reached the level to be classified as level 7. Total amount of radioactive materials released to the environment in this accident is one tenth as much as one in the Chernobyl accident so far.			Level 3 *2		-
Remarks	<p>●Progress of the work to restore cooling function TEPCO announced its plan to bring the damaged reactors to stable condition known as "cold shutdown" in about 6 to 9 months, a situation in which water temperatures inside the reactors have been stably brought below 100 C.(4/17, revised on 5/17) High radiation circumstance hampering the work to restore reactor cooling function. Discharging radioactive water in the basement of the buildings and concrete tunnels outside the buildings counties at unit 2 and 3. Works inside the reactor bldg becomes available after radiation inside were forcibly decreased through air purification. Emergency power generators were moved to higher ground in order to prevent the reactors' cooling systems from failing in case of major tsunami hits. External power source becomes more reliable after connecting 3 power lines with each other, which are for Unit 1/2, for Unit 3/ 4 and for Unit 5/6. The damaged containment vessel of unit 2 is need to be repaired before the work to restore reactor cooling function. TEPCO has been working to create a system to decontaminate and circulate water back into the reactors to cool them down since the discovery that water level in reactor No1 is very low. TEPCO announced the results of the core damage analyses, which showed the fuel pellets had melted and fallen to the bottom of the reactor vessel at Unit 1 while at Unit 2 and 3 the core had stayed at the fuel area in the vessel, without damaging the vessel, even though the part of the core had melted (5/15, 23). Another analysis, which was performed assuming that the reactor water level had not recovered after dropping below the bottom of the fuel at Unit 2 and 3, showed that the most of the core had melted and fallen to the bottom of the reactor, causing a limited damage to the vessel. TEPCO also predicts that an event associated with large amount of radioactive material release is not likely to happen in the future since the reactors have been cooled by means of water injection.*2</p> <p>●Function of containing radioactive material It is presumed that radioactive material inside the reactor vessel may leaked outside. Nitrogen gas injection into the Unit 1containment vessel to prevent hydrogen explosion started on April 6th and continues. Preparation work for covering the reactor building was started at Unit 1 (5/13). Operation for installing the the cover over the building is scheduled to start in June.</p> <p>●Cooling the spent fuel pool (SFP) Injecting and/or spraying water to the SFP continues for the purpose of cooling and making up water evaporated. Corrosion inhibitor, Hydrazine (H2NNH2), has been injected into the SFP (5/9-). Work for structural reinforcement to support the SFP is in progress at unit 4 prior to heat exchanger insulation for SFP cooling. Construction work to install heat exchangers to cool the SFP is in progress at unit 2. <u>Cooling the SFP is planned to start on May 31st.</u></p> <p>●Prevention of the proliferation of radioactively contaminated substance: TEPCO announced the plans to prevent radioactively contaminated water, dust and soil and radioactive material itself existing on site from spreading on Apr 17. Full operation of spraying synthetic resin to contain contaminated dust started on Apr. 26th and continues.</p> <p>●Worker's exposure dose: 30 workers has been exposed to radiation more than 100 mSv as of 5/11. *Emergency exposure dose limit has been set to 250mSv.</p>					

[Source]  
Government Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters:  
News Release (-5/23 17:00), Press conference  
NISA: News Release (-5/25 12:00), Press conference  
TEPCO: Press Release (-5/26 09:00), Press Conference

[Abbreviations]  
MEXT: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology  
INES: International Nuclear Event Scale  
NISA: Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency  
TEPCO: Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.  
NSC: Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan

\*1 TEPCO estimated that severe damage of spent fuels is not likely in the Unit 4 spent fuel pool after examining the radioactive substance detected from the pool and some pictures of the pool. (4/13, 28, 29)  
\*2 TEPCO announced the results of the core damage analyses of Unit 1through 3 (5/15, 23).

[Significance judged by JAIF]  
■ Low  
■ High  
■ Severe (Need immediate action)


Power Station	Fukushima Dai-ni Nuclear Power Station			
Unit	1	2	3	4
Electric / Thermal Power output (MW)	1100 / 3293			
Type of Reactor	BWR-5	BWR-5	BWR-5	BWR-5
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service -> Automatic Shutdown			
Status	All the units are in cold shutdown.			
INES (estimated by NISA)	Level 3	Level 3	—	Level 3
Remarks	<p>Unit-1, 2, 3 &amp; 4, which were in full operation when the earthquake occurred, all shutdown automatically.</p> <p>External power supply was available after the quake. While injecting water into the reactor pressure vessel using make-up water system, TEPCO recovered the core cooling function and made the unit into cold shutdown state one by one.</p> <p>No parameter has shown abnormality after the earthquake occurred off an shore of Miyagi prefecture at 23:32, Apr. 7th.</p> <p>Latest Monitor Indication: <u>1.6 <math>\mu</math> Sv/h at 09:00, May 26th</u> at NPS border</p> <p>Evacuation Area: 3km from NPS(3/12 7:45), 10km from NPS(3/12 17:39), 8km from NPS(4/21)</p>			

Power Station	Onagawa Nuclear Power Station		
Unit	1	2	3
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service -> Automatic Shutdown		
Status	All the units are in cold shutdown.		
Remarks	<p>3 out of 4 external power lines in service with another line under construction broke down after an earthquake occurred off the shore of Miyagi prefecture at 23:32, Apr. 7th. All 5 external power lines have become available by Apr. 10th. Monitoring posts' readings have shown no abnormality. All SFP cooling systems had been restored after shutting down due to the earthquake.</p>		

Power Station	Tokai Dai-ni
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service -> Automatic Shutdown
Status	In cold shutdown.
Remarks	No abnormality has been found after an earthquake occurred off the shore of Miyagi prefecture at 23:32, Apr. 7th.

**Parameters in the Table**

JAIF picks up these parameters to evaluate safety condition of the nuclear plants during this accident from the view point of the principles of nuclear power plant safety, which are "Shutdown", "Cooling" and "Containment". Then we create the chart. The following diagram is to show the correspondence relation of these parameters in the table to nuclear power plant safety.





1. Latest Major event and response

May 24th

09:00-19:00 Water accumulating in the basement of Unit 6 T/B was transferred to a makeshift tank.

09:00-16:00 Operation of removing debris was conducted using remote-controlled heavy machinery.

10:15-13:35 Freshwater with some hydrazine was injected into the SFP at Unit 3.

11:00-14:00 Operation of spraying synthetic resin was conducted to prevent scatter of radioactive materials.

May 25th

09:14-09:18 Nitrogen injection into the Unit 1 containment vessel was stopped temporarily due to switching of the power system.

09:05 Transfer of highly radioactive water accumulating in the concrete tunnel of the Unit 2 T/B to the centralized waste process facility was temporarily stopped due to switching of the power system.

09:10 Transfer of highly radioactive water accumulating in the basement of the Unit 3 T/B to the centralized waste process facility was temporarily stopped due to checking the transfer line and the building.

09:00- Water accumulating in the basement of Unit 6 T/B was transferred to a makeshift tank.

2. Chronology of Nuclear Power Stations

(1) Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS

	Unit 1	Unit 2	Unit 3	Unit 4	Unit-5 and 6
Major Incidents and Actions	11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of power)	11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of power)	11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of power)	14th 04:08 Water temperature in Spent Fuel Storage Pool increased at 84°C	19th 05:00 Cooling SFP with RHR-pump started at Unit 5 19th 22:14 Cooling SFP with RHR-pump started at Unit 6
*The Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness	11th 16:36 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Incapability of water injection by core cooling function)	11th 16:36 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Incapability of water injection by core cooling function)	12th 20:41 Start venting	15th 09:38 Fire occurred on 3rd floor (extinguished spontaneously)	20th 14:30 Cold shutdown achieved at Unit 5. 20th 19:27 Cold shutdown achieved at Unit 6.
	12th 00:49 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Abnormal rise of CV pressure)	13th 11:00 Start venting	13th 05:10 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Loss of reactor cooling functions)	16th 05:45 Fire occurred (extinguished spontaneously)	22nd 19:41 All power source was switched to external AC power at Unit 5 and 6.
	12th 14:30 Start venting	14th 13:25 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Loss of reactor cooling functions)	13th 08:41 Start venting	Since 20th, operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool continues.	Apr. 1st 13:40 Start transferring pooled water in the Unit 6 radioactive waste process facility to the Unit 5 condenser.
	12th 15:36 Hydrogen explosion	14th 16:34 Seawater injection to RPV	13th 13:12 Seawater injection to RPV	29th 11:50 lights in the main control room becomes available	May1 14:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank started.
	12th 20:20 Seawater injection to RPV	14th 22:50 Report IAW Article 15* (Abnormal rise of CV pressure)	14th 05:20 Start venting	Apr. 13 13:50 Installation of silt fences in front of the Unit 3 and 4 seawater screen completed	May2 10:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted. May 2 11:03 The Residual heat removal pump temporarily stopped while start up transformer testing
	22nd 11:20 RPV temperature increased	15th 00:02 Start venting	14th 07:44 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Abnormal rise of CV pressure)	May 5 12:19 Operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool with concrete pump truck conducted.	May3 14:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.
	22nd 02:33 Seawater injection through feed water line started in addition to fire extinguish line	15th 06:10 Sound of explosion, Suppression Pool damage suspected	14th 11:01 Hydrogen explosion	May 6 12:38 Operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool with concrete pump truck conducted.	May7 10:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.
	24th 11:30 lights in the main control room becomes available	15th 08:25 White smoke reeked	15th 10:22 Radiation dose 400mSv/h	May 7 14:05 Operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool with concrete pump truck conducted.	May9 14:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.
	25th 15:37 Freshwater injection to the reactor started.	20th 15:05 operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool started.	16th 08:34, 10:00 White smoke reeked	May 11 16:07 Operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool with concrete pump truck conducted.	May10 10:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.
	27th 08:30 Continuing to transfer the water in the basement of the turbine building	26th 10:10 Freshwater injection to the reactor started.	Since 17th, operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool continues.	May 15 16:25 Operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool with concrete pump truck conducted.	May10 11:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in reactor bldg of unit-6 to the waste processing facility conducted.
	31st 09:20-11:25 Work to remove the water in the trench	26th 16:46 lights in the main control room becomes available	21st 15:55 Slightly gray smoke erupted (18:02 settled)	May 17 16:14 Operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool with concrete pump truck conducted.	May11 10:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.
	31st 12:00 Start to transfer the water in the CST to the surge tank (- 15:27, Apr. 2)	29th 16:45 Start to transfer the water in the CST to the surge tank	22nd 22:46 lights in the main control room becomes available	May 19 16:30 Operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool with concrete pump truck conducted.	May11 11:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in reactor bldg of unit-6 to the waste processing facility conducted.
	31st 13:03 Start water injection to SFP	Apr. 2nd 16:25 Start injecting concrete to stop water leakage from the pit near the intake	25th 18:02 Freshwater injection to the reactor started.	May 21 16:00 Operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool with concrete pump truck conducted.	May12 10:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.
	Apr. 3rd 12:18 Switch power supply for water injection pumps to the RPV from power supply vehicles to originally equipped power source	Apr. 2nd 17:10 Start transferring water in the condenser to the CST	28th 17:40 Start to transfer the water in the CST to the surge tank	May 17 10:11 Volume of water through feed water line and fire extinguishing lineto No.3 Reactor increased	May12 10:30 The operation of transferring water accumulated in reactor bldg of unit-6 to the waste processing facility conducted.
	Apr. 7th 01:31 Injection of Nitrogen gas started after opening all valves through the line.	Apr. 3rd 12:18 Switch power supply for water injection pumps to the RPV from power supply vehicles to originally equipped power source	Apr. 3rd 12:18 Switch power supply for water injection pumps to the RPV from power supply vehicles to originally equipped power source	May 17 18:04 Start transferring water accumulated in the turbine building and the concrete tunnel to the waste processing facility	May13 10:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.
	Apr. 10th 09:30 Transfer of water from the main condenser to the CST completed.	Apr. 5th 15:07 Regarding leakage from the pit that is closed to discharge outlet of unit-2, hardening agent was injected to hole dug surrounding the pit. (Apr. 6 05:38 It was confirmed that water flow stopped)	Apr. 13 13:50 Installation of silt fences in front of the Unit 3 and 4 seawater screen completed	May 18 16:30 Examine the reactor BLDG prior to nitrogen injection	May 13 11:00 Water accumulated in the room for high pressure injection system discharged to other space.
	Apr. 14 12:20 Installation of silt fences in front of the Unit 1and 2 seawater screen and intake completed	Apr. 9th 13:10 Transfer of water from the main condenser to the CST completed.	Apr 17 11:30 Start investigation of the inside of R/B using a remote-controlled robot.	May 20 14:15 Volume of water through feed water line and fire extinguishing lineto No.3 Reactor changed (increase)	May14 10:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.
	Apr 17 16:00 Start investigation of the inside of R/B using a remote-controlled robot.	Apr. 13th 17:04 Transfer of highly radioactively contaminated wafter accumulated in the trench outside the turbine building to the condenser completed	May 8 12:10 Water injected the SFP by temporally installed motor driven pump conducted.	May 20 17:39 Volume of water through feed water line and fire extinguishing lineto No.3 Reactor changed (increase)	
	Apr. 29 11:36 The inside of the building was inspected. It was confirmed that there is no water significant leakage from the CV.	Apr. 14 12:20 Installation of silt fences in front of the Unit 1and 2 seawater screen and intake completed	May 9 12:14 Water injected the SFP by originally installed clean up system conducted.		
	May 2 12:58 Water feeding was temporally switched from to the reactor injection pump to the fire pump to install alarm device to the reactor injection pump.	Apr. 15th 14:15 Installation of steel plate in front of Unit 2 seawater screen completed	May 15 14:33 180kg of boric acid injection to No3 Reactor started.		
	May 5 11:32-16:36 Ventilators to clean the highly radioactive air inside the reactor building were installed and started.	Apr 18 13:42 Start investigation of the inside of R/B using a remote-controlled robot.	May 17 10:11 Volume of water through feed water line and fire extinguishing lineto No.3 Reactor increased		
	May 11 08:58 N2 injection to the CV temporally stopped while the work for restoring one of external power sources being conducted. It resumed later.	Apr. 19 10:08 Start transferring highly radioactive water accumulated in the turbine building and the concrete tunnel to the waste processing facility	May 17 18:04 Start transferring water accumulated in the turbine building and the concrete tunnel to the waste processing facility		
	May 12 05:00 Instrumental reading of the water gage of the reactor No1 went off the scale on the lower side after adjusting the gage.	Apr. 30 14:05 Start transferring highly radioactive water accumulated in the vertical part of the concrete tunnel outside the turbine BLDG to the waste processing facility	May 18 16:30 Examine the reactor BLDG prior to nitrogen injection		
May 17 11:50 Volume of water injected was changed to 6 m3/h from 10 m3/h.	May 1 13:35 The work to block the vertical concrete tunnel outside the turbine bldg started.	May 20 14:15 Volume of water through feed water line and fire extinguishing lineto No.3 Reactor changed (increase)			
May 20 15:06 Water injected to the SFP	May 2 12:58 Water feeding was temporally switched from to the reactor injection pump to the fire pump to install alarm device to the reactor injection pump.	May 20 17:39 Volume of water through feed water line and fire extinguishing lineto No.3 Reactor changed (increase)			

	May 22 15:33 Water injected to the SFP	May 6 09:36 Water injected to the SFP	May 23 11:31 Volume of water through feed water line and fire extinguishing line to No.3 Reactor changed (decrease)		May 15 10:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.
		May 7 09:22 Operation of discharging water accumulated in the concrete tunnel outside turbine bldg to the waste processing facility temporarily stopped while piping work for feeding water into the reactor being conducted.	May 23 14:08 Volume of water through feed water line and fire extinguishing line to No.3 Reactor changed (decrease)		
		May 10 13:09 Water injected to the SFP conducted			May 16 10:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.
		May 12 15:20 Operation of discharging water accumulated in the concrete tunnel outside turbine bldg to the waste processing facility temporarily restarted,			
		May 14 13:00 Water injected to the SFP			May 17 10:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.
		May 18 09:23 4 workers entered the reactor BLDG to measure radiation			May 18 10:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.
		May 18 13:10 Hydrazine added freshwater was injected into the SFP at Unit 2 using concrete pump vehicle.			May 18 10:30 transferring water accumulated in the reactor bldg to the waste processing facility conducted
		May 22 13:02 Hydrazine added freshwater was injected into the SFP at Unit 2 using concrete pump vehicle.			
Major Data *1	Reactor Water level (May 25 09:00) (A) (Lower beyond lower end of the gauge, (B) -1650mm Reactor pressure (May 25 09:00) (A) 0.553MPaG, (B) 1.498MPaG*2 CV pressure (May 25 09:00) 0.1334MPaabs RPV temperature (May 25 09:00) 115.4°C*2 at feed water line nozzle Thermography (Apr. 26 23:00) CV: 25°C, SFP: 23°C	Reactor Water level (May 25 09:00) (A) -1500mm, (B) -2100mm Reactor pressure (May 25 09:00) (A) -0.018MPaG*2, (B) -0.020MPaG*2 CV pressure (May 25 09:00) 0.040MPaabs RPV temperature (May 25 09:00) 111.7°C at feed water line nozzle Water temperature in SFP (May 25 09:00) 45°C Thermography (Apr. 26 07:30) Top of R/B: 24°C	Reactor Water level (May 25 11:00) (A) -1800mm, (B) -2000mm Reactor pressure (May 25 11:00) (A) -0.132MPaG*2, (B) -0.108MPaG*2 CV pressure (May 25 11:00) 0.1005MPaabs RPV temperature (May 25 11:00) 110.9°C*2 at feed water line nozzle Water temperature in SFP (May 08) 62°C Thermography (Apr. 26 07:30) CV: 26°C, SFP: 56°C	Water temperature in SFP (May 07) 84°C	Water temperature of SFP Unit 5 43.6°C (May 25 12:00) Unit 6 39.0°C (May 25 12:00)

**(2) Fukushima Dai-ichi NPPs**

All units are cold shutdown (Unit-1, 2, 4 have been recovered from a event falling under Article 15\*)

**3. State of Emergency Declaration**

11th 19:03 State of nuclear emergency was declared (Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS)

12th 07:45 State of nuclear emergency was declared (Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS)

**4. Evacuation Order**

11th 21:23 PM direction: for the residents within 3km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate, within 10km radius from Fukushima I to stay in-house

12th 05:44 PM direction: for the residents within 10km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate

12th 17:39 PM direction: for the residents within 10km radius from Fukushima II to evacuate

12th 18:25 PM direction: for the residents within 20km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate

15th 11:06 PM direction: for the residents within 20-30km radius from Fukushima I to stay in-house

25th Governmental advise: for the residents within 20-30 km radius from Fukushima I to voluntarily evacuate

**Abbreviations:**

SFP: Spent Fuel Storage Pool

EDG: Emergency Diesel Generator

RPV: Reactor Pressure Vessel

R/B: Reactor Building

RHR: Residual Heat Removal system

CST: Condensate water Storage Tank

T/B: Turbine Building

\*1 Trend data of primary parameters are available at Japan Nuclear Technology Institute's Home Page; "http://www.gengikyo.jp/english/shokai/special\_4.html".

\*2 Data trend is continuously monitored.

