# Information on Status of Nuclear Power Plants in Fukushima



Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.

Policy on information and compilation

This JAIF-compiled information chart represents the situation, phenomena, and operations in which JAIF estimates and guesses the reactors and related facilities are, based on the latest data and information directly and indirectly made available by the relevant organizations when JAIF's updating works done. Consequently, JAIF may make necessary changes to descriptions in the chart, once (1) new developments have occurred in the status of reactors and facilities and (2) JAIF has judged so needed after reexamining the prior information and judgments.

JAIF will do its best to keep tracks on the information on the nuclear power plants quickly and accurately.

#### Status of nuclear power plants in Fukushima as of 10:00, April 17th (Estimated by JAIF)

Power Station			Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station			
Unit	1	2	3	4	5	6
Electric / Thermal Power output (MW)	460 / 1380	784 / 2381	784 / 2381	784 / 2381	784 / 2381	1100 /3293
Type of Reactor	BWR-3	BWR-4	BWR-4	BWR-4	BWR-4	BWR-5
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service -> Shutdown	In Service -> Shutdown	In Service -> Shutdown	Outage	Outage	Outage
Fuel assemblies loaded in Core	400	548	548	No fuel rods	548	764
Core and Fuel Integrity (Loaded fuel assemblies)	Damaged (70%*1)	Damaged (30%*1)	Damaged (25%*1)	No fuel rods	Not Da	
Reactor Pressure Vessel structural integrity	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Not Damaged	Not Da	
Containment Vessel structural integrity	Not Damaged (estimation)	Damage and Leakage Suspected	Not damaged (estimation)	Not Damaged	Not Da	
Core cooling requiring AC power 1						
(Large volumetric freshwater injection)	Not Functional				tional 	
Core cooling requiring AC power 2 (Cooling through Heat Exchangers)	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not necessary	(in cold s	ioning shutdown)
Building Integrity	Severely Damaged (Hydrogen Explosion)	Slightly Damaged	Severely Damaged (Hydrogen Explosion)	Severely Damaged Open a vent hole on the re (Hydrogen Explosion) hydrogen exp		
Water Level of the Rector Pressure Vessel	Fuel exposed partially or fully	Fuel exposed partially or fully	Fuel exposed partially or fully	Safe	Sa	afe
Pressure / Temperature of the Reactor Pressure Vessel	Gradually increasing / Decreased a little after increasing over 400°C on Mar. 24th	Unknown / Stable	Unknown	Safe	Sa	afe
Containment Vessel Pressure	Decreased a little after increasing up to 0.4Mpa on Mar. 24th	Stable	Stable	Safe	Sa	afe
Water injection to core (Accident Management)	Continuing (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Continuing (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Continuing (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Not necessary	Not ned	cessary
Water injection to Containment Vessel (AM)	(To be confirmed)	to be decided (Seawater)	(To be confirmed)	Not necessary	Not nec	cessary
Containment Venting (AM)	Temporally stopped	Temporally stopped	Temporally stopped	Not necessary	Not nec	
Fuel assemblies stored in Spent Fuel Pool	292	587	514	1331	946	876
Fuel Integrity in the spent fuel pool	Unknown	Unknown	Damage Suspected	some of the spent fuel may have been damaged*3		amaged
Cooling of the spent fuel pool			Continued water spray and injection (Switch from	Continued water spray and injection (Switch from seawater to freshwater)  Hydrogen from the pool exploded on Mar. 15th		
Main Control Room Habitability & Operability	Poor due to loss of AC power  (Lighting working in the control room at Unit 1 and 2.)  Poor due to loss of AC power  (Lighting working in the control room at Unit 3 and 4.)			Not damage	d (estimate)	
Environmental effect	Small amount of plutonium was detected from Radioactive materials were detected from un )  There is highly radioactively contaminated was Radioactive materials exceeding the regulator much as legal limit.(4/14)  TEPCO and MEXT has expanded the monitor Influence to the people's life  Radioactive material was detected from milk Radioactive iodine, exceeding the provisional Small fish caught in waters off the coast of Il Small amount of strontium was detected from	In the soil sampled at Fukushima Dai-ichi Inderground water sampled near the turbine later accumulated on the basement of Unitary limit have been detected from seawater ring for the surrounding sea area since Appliand agricultural products from Fukushima legal limit, was detected from tap water subaraki on Apr. 4 have been found to contain some samples of soil and plants taken in	e buildings. (3/30). The concentration of the radioactive 2 turbine building and in the concrete tunnel for piping resample collected in the sea surrounding the Fukushi re 4th.  and neighboring prefectures. The government issued of ampled in some prefectures.  in radioactive cesium and iodine above the legal limit. (4) in the area that is 20-80 km far from the power station.	re materials has increased and the monitoring of the goutside the building.  ma Dai-ichi NPS since Mar. 21st. I-131detected at no properties order to limit shipment (3/21-) and intake (3/23-) for the days of the monitoring of th	ear the discharge outle	
Evacuation	<3> Shall be evacuated for within 20km from evacuation zone around the Fukushima Daiic so. People living in the 20 to 30km and other	NPS (issued at 18:25, Mar. 12th) <4> Sha hi NPS is to be expanded so as to include r than the expanded evacuation area ment	om NPS (issued at 21:23, Mar. 11th) <2> Shall be eva all stay indoors (issued at 11:00, Mar. 15th), Should con the area, where annual radiation exposure is expected tioned above, are asked to get prepared for staying ind	nsider leaving (issued at 11:30, Mar. 25th) for from 20 If to be above 20mSv. People in the expanded zone a	Okm to 30km from NPS are ordered to evacuat	
INES (estimated by NISA)	Level 7*2					_
Remarks	Progress of the work to recover injection function  High radiation circumstance hampering the work to restore originally installed pumps for injection at unit-1,2 and 3. Discharging radioactive water in the basement of the buildings of Unit 1 through 3 continue to improve this situation. Highly radioactively contaminated water accumulated inside the concrete tunnel for piping outside the building is being transferred to the condenser at Unit 2 as of Apr. 13. The transfer lowered the water level in the tunnel by 8 centimeters, but it began rising again, exceeding the previous level. Work for securing and confirming the tightness of the radioactive waste process facility, where the contaminated water in the tunnel is to be transferred, and the hoses are continued on Apr. 16th.  Function of containing radioactive material  It is presumed that radioactive material inside the reactor vessel may leaked outside at Unit 1, 2 and Unit 3, based on radioactive material found outside. NISA announced that the reactor pressure vessel of Unit 2 and 3 may have lost air tightness because of low pressure inside the pressure vessel. NISA told that it is unlikely that these are cracks or holes in the reactor pressure vessels at the same occasion.  Nitrogen gas injection into the Unit 1 containment vessel has been continued to reduce the possibility of hydrogen explosion since Apr. 6th. The pressure of the vessel has hardly risen for the past a few days and leakage of the vessel is suspected. While the originally planned amount of nitrogen has been injected by Apr. 16th, injection will be continued for a while to maintain the concentration of nitrogen in the vessel.  Cooling the spent fuel pool  Steam like substance rose intermittently from the reactor building at Unit 1, 2, 3 and 4 has been observed. Injecting and/or spraying water to the spent fuel pool has been conducted.  Prevention of the proliferation of contaminated dust. Testing the spraying synthetic resin to contaminated dust began on Apr. 1st.					
[Source]	[Abbreviations]	tion Culture Sports Science and Technol	*1 TEPCO's estimation based on the ra	diation level in the CV	Significance	judged by JAIF]

[Source] Government Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters: News Release (-4/16 17:00), Press conference NISA: News Release (-4/16 15:00), Press conference TEPCO: Press Release (-4/16 09:00), Press Conference

MEXT: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology INES: International Nuclear Event Scale NISA: Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency TEPCO: Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc. NSC: Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan

- \*2 Correction: Rating was raised from 5 to 7 for the accident of Unit 1 through 3
- \*3 It is presumed that some of the spent fuel may have been damaged based on radioactive substance detected from the water sample taken from the pool of Unit 4.

Low High

Severe (Need immediate


Power Station	Fukushima Dai-ni Nuclear Power Station				
Unit	1	2	3	4	
Electric / Thermal Power output (MW)	1100 / 3293				
Type of Reactor	BWR-5	BWR-5	BWR-5	BWR-5	
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service → Automatic Shutdown				
Status	All the units are in cold shutdown.				
INES (estimated by NISA)	Level 3	Level 3	_	Level 3	
Remarks	Unit-1, 2, 3 & 4, which were in full operation when the earthquake occurred, all shutdown automatically. External power supply was available after the quake. While injecting water into the reactor pressure vessel using make-up water system, TEPCO recovered the core cooling function and made the unit into cold shutdown state one by one. No parameter has shown abnormality after the earthquake occurred off an shore of Miyagi prefecture at 23:32, Apr. 7th. Latest Monitor Indication: 2.5 \( \mu \) Sv/h at 09:00, Apr. 15th at NPS border Evacuation Area: 10km from NPS				

Power Station	Onagawa Nuclear Power Station				
Unit	1	2	3		
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service -> Automatic Shutdown				
Status	All the units are in cold shutdown.				
	3 out of 4 external power lines in service with another line under construction broke down after an earthquake occurred off the shore of Miyagi prefecture at 23:32, Apr. 7th. All 5 external power lines have become available by Apr. 10th. Monitoring posts' readings have shown no abnormality. All SFP cooling systems had been restored after shutting down due to the earthquake.				

Power Station	Tokai Dai-ni			
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service -> Automatic Shutdown			
Status	In cold shutdown.			
Remarks	No abnormality has been found after an earthquake occurred off the shore of Miyagi prefecture at 23:32, Apr. 7th.			

#### Parameters in the Table

JAIF picks up these parameters to evaluate safety condition of the nuclear plants during this accident from the view point of the principles of nuclear power plant safety, which are "Shutdown", "Cooling" and "Containment". Then we create the chart. The following diagram is to show the correspondence relation of these parameters in the table to nuclear power plant safety.



### JAIF

#### 1. Latest Major event and response

Apr. 14th

12:20 Silt fences were installed in front of the the seawater screen and the intake of Unit 1 and 2.

Apr. 15th

14:15 Iron plates were installed in front of the the seawater screen at Unit 1 and 2.

14:30 Sandbags containing absorbent named zeoliteon were dropped into the sea at three places near the seawater screen between Unit 3 and 4.

#### 2. Chronology of Nuclear Power Stations

	Unit 1	Unit 2	Unit 3	Unit 4	Unit-5 and 6
Major Incidents and Actions	11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of power)	11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of power)	11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of power)	14th 04:08 Water temperature in Spent Fuel Storage Pool increased at 84°C	19th 05:00 Cooling SFP with RHR-pump started at Unit 19th 22:14 Cooling SFP with RHR-pump started at Unit
The Act on Special Measures Concerning	11th 16:36 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Incapability of water injection by core cooling function)	11th 16:36 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Incapability of water injection by core cooling function)	117th 70.41 Start Venting	15th 09:38 Fire occurred on 3rd floor (extinguished spontaneously)	20th 14:30 Cold shutdown achieved at Unit 5. 20th 19:27 Cold shutdown achieved at Unit 6.
Nuclear Emergency Preparedness	12th 00:49 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Abnormal rise of CV pressure)	13th 11:00 Start venting		16th 05:45 Fire occurred (extinguished spontaneously)	22nd 19:41 All power source was switched to external A power at Unit 5 and 6.
	12th 14:30 Start venting	14th 13:25 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Loss of reactor cooling functions)	13th 08:41 Start Venting	Since 20th, operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool continues.	Apr. 1st 13:40 Start transferring pooled water in the Uni
	12th 15:36 Hydrogen explosion	14th 16:34 Seawater injection to RPV	13th 13:12 Seawater injection to RPV	29th 11:50 lights in the main control room becomes available	radioactive waste process facility to the Unit 5 condense
	12th 20:20 Seawater injection to RPV	14th 22:50 Report IAW Article 15* (Abnormal rise of CV pressure)	14th 05:20 Start venting		
	22nd 11:20 RPV temperature increased	15th 00:02 Start venting	14th 07:44 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Abnormal rise of CV pressure)		
	22nd 02:33 Seawater injection through feed water line started in addition to fire extinguish	15th 06:10 Sound of explosion, Suppression Pool damage suspected	14th 11:01 Hydrogen explosion		
	24th 11:30 lights in the main control room becomes available	15th 08:25 White smoke reeked	15th 10:22 Radiation dose 400mSv/h		
	25th 15:37 Freshwater injection to the reactor started.	20th 15:05 operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool started.	16th 08:34, 10:00 White smoke reeked		
	27th 08:30 Continuing to transfer the water in the basement of the turbine building	26th 10:10 Freshwater injection to the reactor started.	Since 17th, operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool continues.		
	31st 09:20-11:25 Work to remove the water in the trench	26th 16:46 lights in the main control room becomes available	21st 15:55 Slightly gray smoke erupted (18:02 settled)		
	31st 12:00 Start to transfer the water in the CST to the surge tank (- 15:27, Apr. 2) 31st 13:03 Start water injection to SFP	29th 16:45 Start to transfer the water in the CST to the surge tank Apr. 2nd 16:25 Start injecting concrete to stop water	becomes available 25th 18:02 Freshwater injection to the reactor		
	Apr. 7th 01:31 Injection of Nitrogen gas started	leakage from the pit near the intake 2nd 17:10 Start transferring water in the conden4er to	started. 28th 17:40 Start to transfer the water in the CST		
	after opening all valves through the line.  Apr. 10th 09:30 Transfer of water from the main condenser to the CST completed.	the CST  Apr. 5th 15:07 Regarding leakage from the pit that is closed to discharge outlet of unit-2, hardening agent	to the surge tank		
	·	was injected to hole dug surrounding the pit. (Apr. 6 05:38 It was confirmed that water flow stopped			
		Apr. 9th 13:10 Transfer of water from the main condenser to the CST completed.			
		Apr. 12th 19:35 Transmission of highly radioactively contaminated wafter accumulated inside trench outside	e		
	Apr. 3rd 12:18 Switch power supply for water init	the turbine building to the condenser started at Unit 2 ection pumps to the RPV from power supply vehicles to	originally equipped power source		
			1	Thermography (Apr. 44.07:40)	+
Major Data *1	Reactor Water level (Apr. <u>16 14:00</u> ) (A) <u>-1650</u> mm, (B) -1650mm	Reactor Water level (Apr. <u>16 12:00</u> ) <u>-1500</u> mm	Reactor Water level (Apr. <u>16 12:10</u> ) (A) -1800mm, (B) -2250mm	Thermography (Apr. 14 07:40) SFP: 63°C	Water temperature of SFP Unit 5 35.7°C (Apr. 16 14:00)
	Reactor pressure (Apr. <u>16 14:00</u> ) (A) 0.423MPaG, (B) <u>0.975MPaG</u> *2	Reactor pressure (Apr. <u>16 12:00</u> ) (A) <u>-0.018</u> MPaG*2, (B) <u>-0.025</u> MPaG*2	Reactor pressure (Apr. <u>16 12:10</u> ) (A) <u>-0.023</u> MPaG*2, (B) <u>-0.085</u> MPaG*2		Unit 6 33.5°C (Apr. 16 14:00)
	CV pressure (Apr. <u>16 15:00</u> ) <u>0.185MPaabs</u>	CV pressure (Apr. <u>16 12:00</u> ) 0.090MPaabs	CV pressure (Apr. <u>16 12:10</u> ) <u>0.1031</u> MPaabs		
	RPV temperature (Apr. <u>16 14:00</u> ) <u>189.9</u> °C*2 at feed water line nozzle	RPV temperature (Apr. <u>16 12:00</u> ) <u>141.6</u> °C at feed water line nozzle Water temperature in SFP (Apr. <u>16 12:00</u> ) 72 <u>.0</u> °C	RPV temperature (Apr. <u>16 12:10</u> ) <u>89.2</u> °C*2 at feed water line nozzle		
	Thermography (Apr. 14 07:40) CV: 33°C, SFP: 36°C	Thermography (Apr. 14 07:40) Top of R/B: 31°C	Thermography (Apr. 14 07:40) CV: 68°C, SFP: 59°C		

#### (2) Fukushima Dai-ni NPPs

All units are cold shutdown (Unit-1, 2, 4 have been recovered from a event falling under Article 15\*)

#### 3. State of Emergency Declaration

11th 19:03 State of nuclear emergency was declared (Fukushima Dai-ni NPS)

12th 07:45 State of nuclear emergency was declared (Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS)

#### 4. Evacuation Order

11th 21:23 PM direction: for the residents within 3km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate, within 10km radius from Fukushima I to stay in-house

12th 05:44 PM direction: for the residents within 10km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate

12th 17:39 PM direction: for the residents within 10km radius from Fukushima II to evacuate

12th 18:25 PM direction: for the residents within 20km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate

15th 11:06 PM direction: for the residents within 20-30km radius from Fukushima I to stay in-house

25th Governmental advise: for the residents within 20-30 km radius from Fukushima I to voluntarily evacuate

Abbreviations:

SFP: Spent Fuel Storage Pool

EDG: Emergency Diesel Generator

RPV: Reactor Pressure Vessel

R/B: Reactor Building

RHR: Residual Heat Removal system

CST: Condensate water Storage Tank

T/B: Turbine Building

\*1 Trend data of primary parameters are available at Japan Nuclear Technology Institute's Home Page;

"http://www.gengikyo.jp/english/shokai/special\_4.html".

\*2 Data trend is continuously monitored.

## Status of the Nuclear Power Plants after the Earthquake

