# Information on Status of Nuclear Power Plants in Fukushima



Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.

Policy on information and compilation

This JAIF-compiled information chart represents the situation, phenomena, and operations in which JAIF estimates and guesses the reactors and related facilities are, based on the latest data and information directly and indirectly made available by the relevant organizations when JAIF's updating works done. Consequently, JAIF may make necessary changes to descriptions in the chart, once (1) new developments have occurred in the status of reactors and facilities and (2) JAIF has judged so needed after reexamining the prior information and judgments.

JAIF will do its best to keep tracks on the information on the nuclear power plants quickly and accurately.

### Status of nuclear power plants in Fukushima as of 18:00, April 16th (Estimated by JAIF)

Danier Chatian		' '	Fukushima Dainishi Nuslaar Dawar Station			
Power Station	1		Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station	A	<u>د</u> ا	
Unit Electric / Thermal Power output (MW)	460 / 1380	2 784 / 2381	784 / 2381	4 784 / 2381	5 6 784 / 2381 1100 /3293	
Type of Reactor	BWR-3	BWR-4	BWR-4	BWR-4	BWR-4 BWR-5	
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service → Shutdown		Outage	Outage		
·						
Fuel assemblies loaded in Core	400	548	548	No fuel rods	548	764
Core and Fuel Integrity (Loaded fuel assemblies)		Damaged (30%*1)	Damaged (25%*1)	No fuel rods	Not Da	
Reactor Pressure Vessel structural integrity	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Not Damaged	Not Damaged  Not Damaged	
Containment Vessel structural integrity	Not Damaged (estimation)	Damage and Leakage Suspected	Not damaged (estimation)	Not Damaged	Not Da	maged
Core cooling requiring AC power 1 (Large volumetric freshwater injection)	Not Functional Not Functional Not Functional Not necessary		Functional			
Core cooling requiring AC power 2 (Cooling through Heat Exchangers)	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not necessary	Functioning (in cold shutdown)	
Building Integrity	Severely Damaged (Hydrogen Explosion)	Slightly Damaged	Severely Damaged (Hydrogen Explosion)	Severely Damaged (Hydrogen Explosion)	Open a vent hole on the rooftop for avoiding hydrogen explosion	
Water Level of the Rector Pressure Vessel	Fuel exposed partially or fully	Fuel exposed partially or fully	Fuel exposed partially or fully	Safe	Sa	ife
Pressure / Temperature of the Reactor Pressure Vessel	Gradually increasing / Decreased a little after increasing over 400°C on Mar. 24th	Unknown / Stable	Unknown	Safe	Safe	
Containment Vessel Pressure	Decreased a little after increasing up to 0.4Mpa on Mar. 24th	Stable	Stable	Safe	Sa	fe
Water injection to core (Accident Management)	Continuing (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Continuing (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Continuing (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Not necessary	Not ned	cessary
Water injection to Containment Vessel (AM)	(To be confirmed)	to be decided (Seawater)	(To be confirmed)	Not necessary	Not ned	cessary
Containment Venting (AM)	Temporally stopped	Temporally stopped	Temporally stopped	Not necessary	Not necessary	
Fuel assemblies stored in Spent Fuel Pool	292	587	514	1331	946	876
Fuel Integrity in the spent fuel pool	Unknown	Unknown	Damage Suspected	some of the spent fuel may have been damaged*3	Not Da	
Cooling of the spent fuel pool	Water spray started (freshwater)	Continued water injection (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Continued water spray and injection (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Continued water spray and injection (Switch from seawater to freshwater) Hydrogen from the pool exploded on Mar. 15th	Pool cooling capab	
Main Control Room Habitability & Operability	Poor due to loss of AC power  (Lighting working in the control room at Unit 1 and 2.)  Poor due to loss of AC power  (Lighting working in the control room at Unit 3 and 4.)		Not damage	d (estimate)		
Environmental effect	Status in Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS site Radiation level: 530 $\mu$ Sv/h at the south side of the office building, $70 \mu$ Sv/h at the Main gate, $28 \mu$ Sv/h at the West gate, as of 15:00, Apr. 15th Small amount of plutonium was detected from the soil sampled at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS site.(3/21-4/4). Radioactive materials were detected from underground water sampled near the turbine buildings. (3/30). The concentration of the radioactive materials has increased and the monitoring of the underground water is to be expanded. (4/16-) There is highly radioactively contaminated water accumulated on the basement of Unit 2 turbine building and in the concrete tunnel for piping outside the building. Radioactive materials exceeding the regulatory limit have been detected from seawater sample collected in the sea surrounding the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS since Mar. 21st. I-131detected at near the discharge outlet is 1600 times as much as legal limit.(4/14) TEPCO and MEXT has expanded the monitoring for the surrounding sea area since Apr 4th.  Influence to the people's life Radioactive material was detected from milk and agricultural products from Fukushima and neighboring prefectures. The government issued order to limit shipment (3/21-) and intake (3/23-) for some products. Radioactive iodine, exceeding the provisional legal limit, was detected from tap water sampled in some prefectures. Small fish caught in waters off the coast of libaraki on Apr. 4 have been found to contain radioactive cesium and iodine above the legal limit.(4/5) Small amount of strontium was detected from some samples of soil and plants taken in the area that is 20-80 km far from the power station.					
Evacuation	<1> Shall be evacuated for within 3km from NPS, Shall stay indoors for within 10km from NPS (issued at 21:23, Mar. 11th) <2> Shall be evacuated for within 10km from NPS (issued at 05:44, Mar. 12th) <3> Shall be evacuated for within 20km from NPS (issued at 18:25, Mar. 12th) <4> Shall stay indoors (issued at 11:00, Mar. 15th), Should consider leaving (issued at 11:30, Mar. 25th) for from 20km to 30km from NPS <5> The 20km evacuation zone around the Fukushima Daiichi NPS is to be expanded so as to include the area, where annual radiation exposure is expected to be above 20mSv. People in the expanded zone are ordered to evacuate within a month or so. People living in the 20 to 30km and other than the expanded evacuation area mentioned above, are asked to get prepared for staying indoors or evacuation in an emergency (issued on Apr. 11th).					
INES (estimated by NISA)	Level 7*2					
Remarks	Progress of the work to recover injection function High radiation circumstance hampering the work to restore originally installed pumps for injection at unit-1,2 and 3. Discharging radioactive water in the basement of the buildings of Unit 1through 3 continue to improve this situation. Highly radioactively contaminated water accumulated inside the concrete tunnel for piping outside the building is being transferred to the condenser at Unit 2 as of Apr. 13. The transfer lowered the water level in the tunnel by 8 centimeters, but it began rising again, exceeding the previous level.  Function of containing radioactive material It is presumed that radioactive material inside the reactor vessel may leaked outside at Unit 1, 2 and Unit 3, based on radioactive material found outside. NISA announced that the reactor pressure vessel of Unit 2 and 3 may have lost air tightness because of low pressure inside the pressure vessel. NISA told that it is unlikely that these are cracks or holes in the reactor pressure vessels at the same occasion.  Nitrogen gas injection into the Unit 1 containment vessel has been continued to reduce the possibility of hydrogen explosion since Apr. 6th. The pressure of the vessel has hardly risen for the past a few days and leakage of the vessel is suspected. The same measure will be taken for Unit 2 and 3.  Cooling the spent fuel pool  Steam like substance rose intermittently from the reactor building at Unit 1, 2, 3 and 4 has been observed. Injecting and/or spraying water to the spent fuel pool has been conducted.  Prevention of the proliferation of contaminated dust: Testing the spraying synthetic resin to contain contaminated dust began on Apr. 1st.					
[Source]	[Abbreviations]	nated dust: Testing the spraying synthetic	resin to contain contaminated dust began on Apr. 1st.  *1 TEPCO's estimation based on the ra		[Significance i	judged by JAIF]

[Source] Government Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters: News Release (-4/15 17:00), Press conference NISA: News Release (-4/16 08:00), Press conference TEPCO: Press Release (-4/15 18:00), Press Conference

MEXT: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology INES: International Nuclear Event Scale

NISA: Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency TEPCO: Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc. NSC: Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan

- \*1 TEPCO's estimation based on the radiation level in the CV
- \*2 Correction: Rating was raised from 5 to 7 for the accident of Unit 1 through 3
- \*3 It is presumed that some of the spent fuel may have been damaged based on radioactive substance detected from the water sample taken from the pool of Unit 4.

[Significance judged by JAIF]

Low High

■Severe (Need immediate


Power Station	Fukushima Dai-ni Nuclear Power Station					
Unit	1	2	3	4		
Electric / Thermal Power output (MW)	1100 / 3293					
Type of Reactor	BWR-5	BWR-5	BWR-5	BWR-5		
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service -> Automatic Shutdown					
Status	All the units are in cold shutdown.					
INES (estimated by NISA)	Level 3	Level 3	_	Level 3		
Remarks	Unit-1, 2, 3 & 4, which were in full operation when the earthquake occurred, all shutdown automatically. External power supply was available after the quake. While injecting water into the reactor pressure vessel using make-up water system, TEPCO recovered the core cooling function and made the unit into cold shutdown state one by one.  No parameter has shown abnormality after the earthquake occurred off an shore of Miyagi prefecture at 23:32, Apr. 7th.  Latest Monitor Indication: 2.5 $\mu$ Sv/h at 09:00, Apr. 15th at NPS border  Evacuation Area: 10km from NPS					

Power Station	Onagawa Nuclear Power Station				
Unit	1	2	3		
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service → Automatic Shutdown				
Status	All the units are in cold shutdown.				
	3 out of 4 external power lines in service with another line under construction broke down after an earthquake occurred off the shore of Miyagi prefecture at 23:32, Apr. 7th. All 5 external power lines have become available by Apr. 10th. Monitoring posts' readings have shown abnormality. All SFP cooling systems had been restored after shutting down due to the earthquake.				

Power Station	Tokai Dai-ni			
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service → Automatic Shutdown			
Status	In cold shutdown.			
Remarks	No abnormality has been found after an earthquake occurred off the shore of Miyagi prefecture at 23:32, Apr. 7th.			

#### Parameters in the Table

JAIF picks up these parameters to evaluate safety condition of the nuclear plants during this accident from the view point of the principles of nuclear power plant safety, which are "Shutdown", "Cooling" and "Containment". Then we create the chart. The following diagram is to show the correspondence relation of these parameters in the table to nuclear power plant safety.



## JAIF

#### 1. Latest Major event and response

Apr. 13th:

13:50 Silt fences were installed in front of the the seawater screen at Unit 3 and 4.

17:04 Transfer of highly radioactively contaminated water accumulated inside the concrete tunnel besides Unit 2 T/B was stopped. About 660 tons of water has been transferred. Apr. 14th

12:20 Silt fences were installed in front of the the seawater screen and the intake at Unit 1 and 2.

Apr. 15th

14:15 Iron plates were installed in front of the the seawater screen at Unit 1 and 2.

#### 2. Chronology of Nuclear Power Stations

#### (1) Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS

(1) Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS	Unit 1	Unit 2	Unit 3	Unit 4	Unit-5 and 6
Maria da di la stata da la Autiona	11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of		11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of	14th 04:08 Water temperature in Spent Fuel	19th 05:00 Cooling SFP with RHR-pump started at Unit 5
Major Incidents and Actions	power)	11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of power)	power)	Storage Pool increased at 84°C	19th 22:14 Cooling SFP with RHR-pump started at Unit 6
*The Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency	11th 16:36 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Incapability of water injection by core cooling function)	11th 16:36 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Incapability of water injection by core cooling function)	12th 20:41 Start venting	15th 09:38 Fire occurred on 3rd floor (extinguished spontaneously)	20th 14:30 Cold shutdown achieved at Unit 5. 20th 19:27 Cold shutdown achieved at Unit 6.
Preparedness  1  1  1  2  2  2  2  2  3  tt  3  A  A  A	12th 00:49 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Abnormal rise of CV pressure)	13th 11:00 Start venting	13th 05:10 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Loss of reactor cooling functions)	16th 05:45 Fire occurred (extinguished spontaneously)	22nd 19:41 All power source was switched to external AC power at Unit 5 and 6.
	12th 14:30 Start venting	14th 13:25 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Loss of reactor cooling functions)	13th 08:41 Start venting	Since 20th, operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool continues.	Apr. 1st 13:40 Start transferring pooled water in the Unit 6
	12th 15:36 Hydrogen explosion	14th 16:34 Seawater injection to RPV	13th 13:12 Seawater injection to RPV	29th 11:50 lights in the main control room becomes available	radioactive waste process facility to the Unit 5 condenser.
	12th 20:20 Seawater injection to RPV	14th 22:50 Report IAW Article 15* (Abnormal rise of CV pressure)	14th 05:20 Start venting		
	22nd 11:20 RPV temperature increased	15th 00:02 Start venting	14th 07:44 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Abnormal rise of CV pressure)		
	22nd 02:33 Seawater injection through feed water line started in addition to fire extinguish line	15th 06:10 Sound of explosion, Suppression Pool damage suspected	14th 11:01 Hydrogen explosion		
	24th 11:30 lights in the main control room becomes available	15th 08:25 White smoke reeked	15th 10:22 Radiation dose 400mSv/h		
	25th 15:37 Freshwater injection to the reactor started.	20th 15:05 operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool started.	16th 08:34, 10:00 White smoke reeked		
	27th 08:30 Continuing to transfer the water in the basement of the turbine building	26th 10:10 Freshwater injection to the reactor started.	Since 17th, operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool continues.		
	31st 09:20-11:25 Work to remove the water in the trench	26th 16:46 lights in the main control room becomes available	21st 15:55 Slightly gray smoke erupted (18:02 settled)		
	31st 12:00 Start to transfer the water in the CST to the surge tank (- 15:27, Apr. 2)	29th 16:45 Start to transfer the water in the CST to the surge tank	22nd 22:46 lights in the main control room becomes available		
	31st 13:03 Start water injection to SFP	Apr. 2nd 16:25 Start injecting concrete to stop water leakage from the pit near the intake	25th 18:02 Freshwater injection to the reactor started.		
	Apr. 7th 01:31 Injection of Nitrogen gas started after opening all valves through the line.	2nd 17:10 Start transferring water in the conden4er to the CST	28th 17:40 Start to transfer the water in the CST to the surge tank		
	Apr. 10th 09:30 Transfer of water from the main condenser to the CST completed.	Apr. 5th 15:07 Regarding leakage from the pit that is closed to discharge outlet of unit-2, hardening agent was injected to hole dug surrounding the pit. (Apr. 6			
		05:38 It was confirmed that water flow stopped  Apr. 9th 13:10 Transfer of water from the main condenser to the CST completed.			
		Apr. 12th 19:35 Transmission of highly radioactively contaminated wafter accumulated inside trench outside the turbine building to the condenser started at Unit 2			
	Apr. 3rd 12:18 Switch power supply for water injection pumps to the RPV from power supply vehicles to originally equipped power source				
Major Data *1	Reactor Water level (Apr. <u>16 06:00</u> ) (A) <u>-1650</u> mm, (B) -1650mm	Reactor Water level (Apr. <u>16 06:00</u> ) -1500mm	Reactor Water level (Apr. <u>16 06:00</u> ) (A) -1800mm, (B) -2250mm	Thermography (Apr. 14 07:40) SFP: 63°C	Water temperature of SFP
	Reactor pressure (Apr. <u>16 06:00</u> ) (A) 0.423MPaG, (B) 0.978MPaG*2	Reactor pressure (Apr. <u>16 06:00</u> ) (A) <u>-0.018</u> MPaG*2, (B) <u>-0.023</u> MPaG*2	Reactor pressure (Apr. <u>16 06:00</u> ) (A) <u>-0.030</u> MPaG*2, (B) <u>-0.085</u> MPaG*2		Unit 5 38.3°C (Apr. 16 07:00) Unit 6 31.0°C (Apr. 16 07:00)
	CV pressure (Apr. <u>16 06:00</u> ) 0.190MPaabs	CV pressure (Apr. <u>16 06:00</u> ) 0.090MPaabs	CV pressure (Apr. <u>16 06:00</u> ) <u>0.1038</u> MPaabs		
	RPV temperature (Apr. <u>16 06:00</u> ) <u>189.9</u> °C*2 at feed water line nozzle	RPV temperature (Apr. <u>16 06:00</u> ) <u>142.8</u> °C at feed water line nozzle Water temperature in SFP (Apr. <u>16 06:00</u> ) <u>48.0</u> °C	RPV temperature (Apr. <u>16 06:00)</u> <u>91.1</u> °C*2 at feed water line nozzle		
	Thermography (Apr. 14 07:40) CV: 33°C, SFP: 36°C	Thermography (Apr. 14 07:40) Top of R/B: 31°C	Thermography (Apr. 14 07:40) CV: 68°C, SFP: 59°C		

#### (2) Fukushima Dai-ni NPPs

All units are cold shutdown (Unit-1, 2, 4 have been recovered from a event falling under Article 15\*)

#### 3. State of Emergency Declaration

11th 19:03 State of nuclear emergency was declared (Fukushima Dai-ni NPS)

12th 07:45 State of nuclear emergency was declared (Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS)

#### 4. Evacuation Order

11th 21:23 PM direction: for the residents within 3km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate, within 10km radius from Fukushima I to stay in-house

12th 05:44 PM direction: for the residents within 10km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate

12th 17:39 PM direction: for the residents within 10km radius from Fukushima II to evacuate

12th 18:25 PM direction: for the residents within 20km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate 15th 11:06 PM direction: for the residents within 20-30km radius from Fukushima I to stay in-house

25th Governmental advise: for the residents within 20-30 km radius from Fukushima I to voluntarily evacuate

Abbreviations:

SFP: Spent Fuel Storage Pool

EDG: Emergency Diesel Generator

RPV: Reactor Pressure Vessel

R/B: Reactor Building

RHR: Residual Heat Removal system

CST: Condensate water Storage Tank

T/B: Turbine Building

\*1 Trend data of primary parameters are available at Japan Nuclear Technology Institute's Home Page;

"http://www.gengikyo.jp/english/shokai/special\_4.html".

\*2 Data trend is continuously monitored.

## Status of the Nuclear Power Plants after the Earthquake

