Information on Status of Nuclear Power Plants in Fukushima



Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.

Policy on information and compilation

JAIF will do its best to keep tracks on the information on the nuclear power plants quickly and accurately.

This JAIF-compiled information chart represents the situation, phenomena, and operations in which JAIF estimates and guesses the reactors and related facilities are, based on the latest data and information directly and indirectly made available by the relevant organizations when JAIF's updating works done. Consequently, JAIF may make necessary changes to descriptions in the chart, once (1) new developments have occurred in the status of reactors and facilities and (2) JAIF has judged so needed after reexamining the prior information and judgments.

Status of nuclear power plants in Fukushima as of <u>16:00, April 5th</u> (Estimated by JAIF)

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Power Station		·	Fukushima Dai−ichi Nuclear Pov	ver Station	
Unit	1	2	3	4	
Electric / Thermal Power output (MW)	460 / 1380	784 / 2381	784 / 2381	784 / 2381	
Type of Reactor	BWR-3	BWR-4	BWR-4	BWR-4	
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service -> Shutdown	In Service -> Shutdown	In Service -> Shutdown	Outage	
Fuel assemblies loaded in Core	400	548	548	No fuel rods	Γ
Core and Fuel Integrity(Loaded fuel assemblies)	Damaged	Damaged	Damaged	No fuel rods	
Reactor Pressure Vessel structural integrity	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Not Damaged	
Containment Vessel structural integrity	Not Damaged (estimation)	Damage and Leakage Suspected	Not damaged (estimation)	Not Damaged	
Core cooling requiring AC power 1 (Large volumetric freshwater injection)	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not necessary	
Core cooling requiring AC power 2 (Cooling through Heat Exchangers)	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not necessary	
Building Integrity	Severely Damaged (Hydrogen Explosion)	Slightly Damaged	Severely Damaged (Hydrogen Explosion)	Severely Damaged (Hydrogen Explosion)	Op
Water Level of the Rector Pressure Vessel	Fuel exposed partially or fully	Fuel exposed partially or fully	Fuel exposed partially or fully	Safe	
Pressure / Temperature of the Reactor Pressure Vessel	Gradually increasing / Decreased a little after increasing over 400°C on Mar. 24th	Unknown / Stable	Unknown	Safe	
Containment Vessel Pressure	Decreased a little after increasing up to 0.4Mpa on Mar. 24th	Stable	Stable	Safe	
Water injection to core (Accident Management)	Continuing(Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Continuing (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Continuing(Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Not necessary	Γ
Water injection to Containment Vessel (AM)	(To be confirmed)	to be decided (Seawater)	(To be confirmed)	Not necessary	
Containment Venting (AM)	Temporally stopped	Temporally stopped	Temporally stopped	Not necessary	
Fuel assemblies stored in Spent Fuel Pool	292	587	514	1331	Γ
Fuel Integrity in the spent fuel pool	Unknown	Unknown	Damage Suspected	Possibly damaged	
Cooling of the spent fuel pool	Water spray started (ffreshwater)	Continued water injection (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Continued water spray and injection (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Continued water spray and injection (Switch from seawater to freshwater) Hydrogen from the pool exploded on Mar. 15th	
Main Control Room Habitability & Operability	Poor due to loss of (Lighting working in the contro			o loss of AC power control room at Unit 3 and 4.)	
Environmental effect	 ●Status in Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS site Radiation level: <u>0.75mSv/h</u> at the south side of the office building, <u>114 µ Sv/h</u> at the Main gate, <u>53 µ Sv/h</u> at the West gate, as of <u>09:00, Apr. 5th</u>. Radiation dose higher than 1000 mSv was measured at the surface of water accumulated on the basement of Unit 2 turbine building and in the tunnel for laying piping outside. Plutonium was detected from the soil of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS site on Mar. 28th. The amount is so small that the Pu is not harmful to human body. Radioactive materials exceeding the regulatory limit have been detected from seawater sample collected in the sea surrounding the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS since Mar. 21st. regulatory limit was detected on Mar. 30th. It is discovered on Apr. 2nd that there is highly radioactive (more than 1000mSv/hr) water in the concrete structure housing electric through cracks on the concrete wall. Efforts to stop the water leakage from the crack is being made. Release of some 10,000 tons of low level radioactive wastewater into the highly radioactive water. TEPCO evaluated that eating fish and seaweed caught near the plant every day for a year would add some 25% of the dose that the general public Radioactive materials were detected from underground water sampled near the turbine buildings on Mar. 30th. ●Influence to the people's life Radioactive index and the material was detected from milk and agricultural products from Fukushima and neighboring prefectures. The government issued order to limit shipment (21st-) and Radioactive iodine, exceeding the provisional legal limit, was detected from tap water sampled in some prefectures from Mar. 21st to 27th. Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan released prediction of radioactive material spread caused by the accident (Mar. 23rd). This prediction was based on the calculation using (System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information).==> http://www.nsc.gojp/info/110323_top_siryo.pdf <				
Evacuation	<1> Shall be evacuated for within 3km from N <3> Shall be evacuated for within 20km from			<2> Shall be evacuated for within 10km from NF 15th), Should consider leaving (issued at 11:30, I	
Evacuation INES (estimated by NISA)					
	<3> Shall be evacuated for within 20km from Level 5 Progress of the work to recover injection for Water injection to the reactor pressure vesses High radiation circumstance hampering the we transfer work is being made to secure a place Function of containing radioactive material It is presumed that radioactive material inside have lost air tightness because of low pressure Cooling the spent fuel pool	NPS (issued at 18:25, Mar. 12th) <4> Level 5 function el by temporally installed pumps were ork to restore originally installed pump e the water to go. Lighting in the turb e the reactor vessel may leaked outsid ure inside the pressure vessel. NISA to n the reactor building at Unit 1, 2, 3 a	Shall stay indoors (issued at 11:00, Mar. Level 5 switched from seawater to freshwater at ps for injection. Discharging radioactive w bine buildings became partly available at de at Unit 1, 2 and Unit 3, based on radioa old that it is unlikely that these are cracks and 4 has been observed. Injecting and/or	15th), Should consider leaving (issued at 11:30, Level 3 Unit 1, 2 and 3. ater in the basement of the buildings of Unit 1th Unit 1through 4. active material found outside. NISA announced the s or holes in the reactor pressure vessels at the spraying water to the spent fuel pool has been of	Ma nroi that

NISA: News Release (-4/5 08:00), Press conference TEPCO: Press Release (-4/5 09:00), Press Conference

NISA: Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency TEPCO: Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.

<mark>High |</mark> Severe (Need immediate action)

F	C	
5	6	
784 / 2381	1100 /3293	
BWR-4	BWR-5	
Outage	Outage	
548	764	
Not Da	maged	
Not Da		
Not Da	maged	
Funct		
Functi (in cold s	hutdown)	
Open a vent hole on the roo		
explo		
Sa	fe	
Safe		
Sa	fe	
Not nec	essary	
Not nec	essary	
Not nec	essary	
946	876	
Not Da	maged	
Pool cooling capabi	lity was recovered	
Not damaged	d (estimate)	
le the building on Mar. 27th. t. Radioactive Iodine, I–131, 4,385 times higher than ctrical cable and this water is leaking into the sea the sea began on Apr. 4th, in order to make room for ibic receive from the environment for a year. nd intake (23rd–) for some products. ng computer code called SPEEDI		
'S (issued at 05:44, Mar. 12th) Mar. 25th) for from 20km to 30km from NPS		
<u> </u>	—	
rough 3 continue to improve		
nat the reactor pressure ves same occasion.	ssel of Unit 2 and 3 may	
anducted		

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Power Station	Fukushima Dai-ni Nuclear Power Station			
Unit	1	2	3	4
Electric / Thermal Power output (MW)	1100 / 3293			
Type of Reactor	BWR-5	BWR-5	BWR-5	BWR-5
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service -> Automatic Shutdown			
Status	All the units are in cold shutdown.			
INES (estimated by NISA)	Level 3	Level 3	—	Level 3
Remarks	Unit-1, 2, 3 & 4, which were in full operation when the earthquake occurred, all shutdown automatically. External power supply was available after the quake. While injecting water into the reactor pressure vessel using make-up water system, TEPCO recovered the core cooling function and made the unit into cold shutdown state one by one. Latest Monitor Indication: <u>3.4 μ Sv/h</u> at <u>09:00, Apr. 5th</u> at NPS border Evacuation Area: 10km from NPS			


Power Station	Onagawa Nuclear Power Station		
Unit	1	2	3
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service -> Automatic Shutdown		
Status	All the units are in cold shutdown.		
Remarks	Safe		
Power Station	Tokai Dai−ni		
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service -> Automatic Shutdown		
Status	In cold shutdown.		
Remarks	Safe		

Parameters in the Table

JAIF picks up these parameters to evaluate safety condition of the nuclear plants during this accident from the view point of the principles of nuclear power plant safety, which are "Shutdown", "Cooling" and "Containment". Then we create the chart. The following diagram is to show the correspondence relation of these parameters in the table to nuclear power plant safety.

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Nuclear Power Plant Safety and related items	Parameters in the tabl
Reactor Shutdown Safety y	→ Operation Status at the earthquake
Cooling Design base cooling	Core cooling requiring AC power1 (Large volumetric freshwater injection)
capability	Core cooling requiring AC power2 (Cooling through Heat Exchangers)
Containment Design base 5 Barriers containment UFuel Pellet	
©Cladding Tube	Core and Fuel Integrity
③Reactor Pressure vessel	Reactor Pressure Vessel Integrity
	Containment Vessel pressure
@Containment Vessel —	Containment Vessel Integrity
⑤Reactor Building —	 Building Integrity
<accident :="" am="" management=""></accident>	→ Iinjection to core (AM)
(Operation beyond design base accident)	Injection to Containment Vessel (AM)
protection against burst	Containment Venting (AM)
Safety of the spent fuel pool	Fuel Integrity in the spent fuel pool (Fuel Damage)
	Cooling of the spent fuel pool (Water injection, pool temp, water level)
Work environment in main control room	Main Control Room Habitability and Oper (ventiration, Lights, Indicator)
Environmental effect	Environmental effect (Radiatiom Monito
Evacuation	Evacuation (Order, Evacuated Area,)



1. Latest Major event and response

April 3rd:

12:18 Power supply to water injection pumps to the reactors of Unit 1, 2, and 3 was switched from power supply vehicles to originally equipped power source. 13:47 A polymer absorbent was poured into a duct as a measure for stopping the water leakage from the pit of Unit 2.

2. Chronology of Nuclear Power Stations

	Unit 1	Unit 2	Unit 3	Unit 4
Major Incidents and Actions	11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of power)	11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of power)	11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of power)	14th 04:08 Water temperature in Spent F Storage Pool increased at 84°C
The Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness	11th 16:36 Event falling under Article 15 occurred (Incapability of water injection by core cooling function)	11th 16:36 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Incapability of water injection by core cooling function)	12th 20:41 Start venting	15th 09:38 Fire occurred on 3rd floor (extinguished spontaneously)
	12th 00:49 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Abnormal rise of CV pressure)	13th 11:00 Start venting	13th 05:10 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Loss of reactor cooling functions)	16th 05:45 Fire occurred (extinguished spontaneously)
	12th 14:30 Start venting	14th 13:25 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Loss of reactor cooling functions)	13th 08:41 Start venting	Since 20th, operation of spraying water t spent fuel pool continues.
	12th 15:36 Hydrogen explosion	14th 16:34 Seawater injection to RPV	13th 13:12 Seawater injection to RPV	29th 11:50 lights in the main control room becomes available
	12th 20:20 Seawater injection to RPV	14th 22:50 Report IAW Article 15* (Abnormal rise of CV pressure)	14th 05:20 Start venting	
	22nd 11:20 RPV temperature increased	15th 00:02 Start venting	14th 07:44 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Abnormal rise of CV pressure)	
	22nd 02:33 Seawater injection through feed water line started in addition to fire extinguish	15th 06:10 Sound of explosion, Suppression Pool damage suspected	14th 11:01 Hydrogen explosion	
	24th 11:30 lights in the main control room becomes available	15th 08:25 White smoke reeked	15th 10:22 Radiation dose 400mSv/h	
	25th 15:37 Freshwater injection to the reactor started.	Since 20th, operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool continues.	16th 08:34, 10:00 White smoke reeked	
	27th 08:30 Continuing to transfer the water in the basement of the turbine building	21st 18:22 White, steam-like smoke erupted from the top of the rector building.	Since 17th, operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool continues.	
	31st 09:20-11:25 Work to remove the water in the trench	26th 10:10 Freshwater injection to the reactor started.	21st 15:55 Slightly gray smoke erupted (18:02 settled)	
	31st 12:00 Start to transfer the water in the CST to the surge tank (- 15:27, Apr. 2)	26th 16:46 lights in the main control room becomes available	22nd 22:46 lights in the main control room becomes available	
	31st 13:03 Start water injection to SFP	29th 16:45 Start to transfer the water in the CST to the surge tank		
		Apr. 2nd 16:25 Start injecting concrete to stop water leakage from the pit near the intake	28th 17:40 Start to transfer the water in the CST to the surge tank	
		2nd 17:10 Start transferring water in the condenser to the CST	Apr. 2nd 9:52-12:54 Spray water to the SFP	
		3rd 13:47 Poured a polymer absorbent as a measure for stopping the water leakage from the pit (no effect)		
		4th 11:05 Start water injection to SFP using temporary motor driven pump		
	Apr. 3rd 12:18 Switch power supply for water inje			
Major Data	(A) <u>-1700mm</u> (B) <u>-1650mm</u>	Reactor Water level (<u>Apr. 05 06:00</u>) <u>-1500mm</u>	Reactor Water level (<u>Apr. 05 05:40</u>) (A) <u>-1850mm</u> , (B) -2250mm	Thermography (Apr. 04 07:20) 30°C (SFP Temp.)
	Reactor pressure (<u>Apr. 05 06:00</u>) (A) <u>0.308MPaG</u> , (B) <u>0.619MPaG</u>	Reactor pressure (<u>Apr. 05 06:00</u>) (A) <u>-0.018MPaG</u> , (B) <u>-0.018MPaG</u>	Reactor pressure (<u>Apr. 05 05:40</u>) (A) <u>0.011MPaG</u> , (B) <u>-0.081MPaG</u>	
	CV pressure (<u>Apr. 05 06:00</u>) <u>0.150MPaabs</u>	CV pressure (<u>Apr. 05 06:00</u>) <u>0.100MPaabs</u>	CV pressure (<u>Apr. 05 05:40</u>) <u>0.1078MPaabs</u>	
	RPV temperature (<u>Apr. 05 06:00</u>) 233.5°C at feed water line nozzle	RPV temperature (<u>Apr. 05 06:00</u>) 141.7°C at feed water line nozzle	RPV temperature (<u>Apr. 05 05:40</u>) 84.7°C at feed water line nozzle (under repair)	
	Thermography (Apr. 04 07:20) 18°C (SFP Temp.)	Water temperature in SFP (<u>Apr. 05 06:00</u>) <u>71°C</u>	Thermography (Apr. 04 07:20) 57°C (SFP Temp.)	
(2) Fukushima Dai-ni NPPs				*SEP: Spent Fuel Storage Pool
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(2) Fukushima Dai-ni NPPs

All units are cold shutdown (Unit-1, 2, 4 have been recovered from a event falling under Article 15*)

3. State of Emergency Declaration

11th 19:03 State of nuclear emergency was declared (Fukushima Dai-ni NPS)

12th 07:45 State of nuclear emergency was declared (Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS)

4. Evacuation Order

11th 21:23 PM direction: for the residents within 3km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate. within 10km radius from Fukushima I to stav in-house

12th 05:44 PM direction: for the residents within 10km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate

12th 17:39 PM direction: for the residents within 10km radius from Fukushima II to evacuate

12th 18:25 PM direction: for the residents within 20km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate

15th 11:06 PM direction: for the residents within 20-30km radius from Fukushima I to stav in-house

25th Governmental advise: for the residents within 20-30 km radius from Fukushima I to voluntarily evacuate

(as of 13:30, April 5th)

*SFP: Spent Fuel Storage Pool EDG: Emergency Diesel Generator

RPV: Reactor Pressure Vessel

R/B: Reactor Building

RHR: Residual Heat Removal system


CST: Condensate water Storage Tank



	Unit-5 and 6
Fuel	19th 05:00 Cooling SFP with RHR-pump started at Unit 5 19th 22:14 Cooling SFP with RHR-pump started at Unit 6
	20th 14:30 Cold shutdown achieved at Unit 5. 20th 19:27 Cold shutdown achieved at Unit 6.
	22nd 19:41 All power source was switched to external AC power at Unit 5 and 6.
to the	Apr. 1st 13:40 Start transferring pooled water in the Unit 6 radioactive waste process facility to the Unit 5
m	condenser.
	Water temperature of SFP Unit 5 <u>35.5°C</u> (<u>Apr. 05 07:00</u>)
	Unit 6 28.5° (Apr. 05 07:00)

Status of the Nuclear Power Plants after the Earthquake

The accident that brings environmental impact is going on at several units in Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power Station after the earthquake occured on March 11th. Other nuclear power plants in Japan are in normal operation or safely shutdown.



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